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ABSTRACT
Many commentators express concern that democracy in
the United States is under threat, whether from the pressure
of concentrated wealth and structural racism, government
secrecy and authoritarian tendencies, an outdated
constitutional structure and old-fashioned corruption, or
perhaps a combination of them all. Against this background,
this Article argues that the Supreme Court’s treatment of
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procedural rights for determining standing—the key that
opens the door to federal court—is an overlooked factor in
contributing to democratic erosion. According to the Court,
violation of a congressionally conferred procedural right that
does not safeguard some separate, non-procedural, concrete
interest of plaintiff—a “procedural right in vacuo,” the Court
calls it—does not constitute Article III injury, and so the right
holder is barred from seeking redress in a federal court. This
is true, the Court says, even in cases in which the “procedural
right” at issue is a statutory right to participate in public
decision-making. Conceding for present purposes that
standing requires a showing of a particular and concrete
injury, this Article argues that a congressionally conferred
right to participate in the processes of self-governance has
value in and of itself, and its infringement should be treated
as Article III injury even if the alleged violation does not cause
financial loss or damage to some other, non-procedural
interest of the right holder. The Court’s devaluation of
congressionally conferred procedural rights in its standing
doctrine not only has diminished opportunities for
democratic practice, but also has destabilized political
institutions that support democratic values. Overall, the
Article seeks to reorient standing doctrine in ways that
support participatory norms as well as intrinsic process
values that serve as guardrails of democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Is democracy in crisis? 1 With increasing frequency
commentators raise concerns that democracy in the United
States is under threat, whether from the pressure of
concentrated wealth and structural racism, government
secrecy and authoritarian tendencies, an outdated
constitutional structure and old-fashioned corruption, or
perhaps a combination of them all. 2 These are all hot button

1. See, e.g., At the Capitol on Jan. 6, a Day of Remembrance and Division,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/01/06/us/jan-6capitol-riot.
2. See Carolyn Shapiro, Democracy, Federalism, and the Guarantee Clause,
62 ARIZ. L. REV. 183, 215 (2020) (“With the election of President Donald Trump
and challenges to democracy observed worldwide, there has been a not-so-small
explosion of books and articles diagnosing and decrying the possible demise of
democracy.”). As examples of this trend, see generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL
ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018); Aziq Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose
a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78 (2018); Ewan McGaughey,
Fascism-Lite in America (Or the Social Ideal of Donald Trump), 7 BRIT. J. AM.
LEGAL STUD. 291 (2018).
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issues that dominate public discussion, 3 and all the more so
after a violent assault on the Capitol sought to undo the
results of the 2020 presidential election. 4 Against this
background, we argue that the Supreme Court’s devaluation
of procedural rights in its standing jurisprudence—and the
Court’s consequent refusal to allow judicial enforcement of
such rights—has contributed to the erosion of democratic
practices in the United States. As the Court sees it, invasion
of a procedural right that is not designed to safeguard some
independent, non-procedural, concrete interest of plaintiff—
a “procedural right in vacuo” as dubbed by the Court—does
not constitute Article III injury, and so the right holder is
barred from federal court, even when Congress has enacted
the “procedural right” in order to facilitate citizen
participation in public decision-making. In our view, a
congressionally conferred right to participate in the
processes of self-governance should be accorded
constitutional value in and of itself, and its infringement
should be treated as Article III injury even if plaintiff suffers
no financial loss or harm to some other non-procedural
interest. The Court’s devaluation of these procedural
rights—which instantiate intrinsic process values of dignity,
respect, and equality—not only has diminished opportunities
for democratic self-governance, but also has destabilized
political institutions that support democratic practice.
This claim may seem overheated, beside the point, or so
narrow as to be insignificant given concerns about
democracy’s survival. 5 Other than in rarified legal circles,
3. See, e.g., Thomas Homer-Dixon, The American Polity is Cracked, and
Might Collapse. Canada Must Prepare, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 31, 2021), https://
www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-american-polity-is-cracked-andmight-collapse-canada-must-prepare/; Paul Krugman, How Democracy Dies,
American-Style, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/09/
opinion/trump-democracy.html.
4. See, e.g., MARK BOWDEN & MATTHEW TEAGUE, THE STEAL: THE ATTEMPT TO
OVERTURN THE 2020 ELECTION AND THE PEOPLE WHO STOPPED IT (2022).
5. Cf. Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A
Plea for “Process Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39 (1974) (remarking on “how

2022]

STANDING FOR DEMOCRACY

527

“standing” and “procedure” generally do not figure into
public explanations of America’s democratic crisis. And even
within those circles, scholars have tended to see standing
doctrine as “opaque” 6 and “amorphous,” 7 with procedure
compounding a sense of technical esoterica. 8 But hear us out.
The argument starts from the premise that democracy—
notwithstanding differences in how democracy is defined 9—
builds on a principle of self-governance that recognizes the
right of each member of the community to participate in
forming and safeguarding the policies by which they are
governed. This principle of self-governance is constituted and
carried out through procedures that enable individuals to
participate on fair and equal terms. As Justice Felix
Frankfurter famously wrote, “Legal process is an essential
part of the democratic process.” 10 In particular, the right to
participate in democratic governance has been called the
“right of rights” 11—a view that articulates a philosophical
often laymen seem ready to dismiss procedural rules as ‘mere technicalities’ even
though these are the very rules which must secure most process values”).
6. Gene R. Nichol, The Roberts Court and Access to Justice, 59 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. 821, 833 (2009) (calling standing doctrine “an opaque labeling exercise”).
7. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). Other criticisms of standing
decisions have been even less generous. See, e.g., JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY:
THE COMING OF AGE IN PUBLIC LAW 1 (1978) (Vinnig states that the Court’s
standing decisions generally suggest “a sense of intellectual crisis. Judicial
behavior is erratic, even bizarre. The opinions and justifications do not
illuminate.”); see also Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650
F.3d 652, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (stating that the Court’s standing
decisions rest on “tenuous” grounds and have been criticized by “reputable
scholars”).
8. Or, as a sitting federal judge has said of the cognate doctrine of the
political question, “If you don’t understand that you’re not alone.” Jed S. Rakoff,
Don’t Count on the Courts, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 5, 2018, at 46, 47.
9. See infra Part I.
10. See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 312
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
11. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 254 (1999); see also Robert A.
Dahl, ON DEMOCRACY 98 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing “the fundamental right of
citizens to participate effectively in governing” as a feature of democratic society).
But see Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1047 (1980) (stating that
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ideal but serves only as a catchy slogan unless it is
constituted by procedure.
Procedural rights enable self-governance by creating
pathways for participation that form the institutional
infrastructure through which democratic decisions are made
and effectuated. In this sense, procedure provides the
architectonic building blocks of democratic practice. While
playing this structural role, procedure also allocates power
to the holder of the right, conferring authority to engage in
forms of self-governance that both justify and provide the
basis for democratic practice. Within this democratic
structure, to borrow from Roderick M. Hills, Jr., procedural
rights afford individuals the right to “equal participation in
the definition of our rights.” 12
Procedural rights of self-governance are individual
rights, but they also facilitate social relations that are
essential for collective action, political mobilization, and the
formation and operation of civil society in general. 13
Moreover, procedure provides the mechanism for resolving
the core tension of democracy—disagreements that result
when a decision is made by a group rather than by an
“it is far from established that participation is the preeminent constitutional
value,” and asserting that “a significant body of constitutional scholarship values
substantive goals above participation”).
12. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 888, 902 (2006); cf. Michael J. Sandel,
The Constitution of the Procedural Republic: Liberal Rights and Civic Virtues, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (contrasting procedural liberalism, which “insists
that the Constitution must defend a framework of rights that is neutral among
ends,” with the “more demanding notion of citizenship and freedom,” which
emphasizes “self-rule, to participate in shaping the forces that govern the
collective destiny”).
13. Cf. Steven Klein, Democracy Requires Organized Collective Power, 30 J.
POL. PHIL. 26, 26–27 (2022) (discussing how procedures affect the organization of
power in democratic society); see also Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Glen Staszewski,
Democratizing Rule Development, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 793, 853 (2021) (“Social
movements can sometimes accomplish more by establishing institutional
structures that provide them (or their allies) with increased representation and
influence within the regulatory process than they can with one-off policy
victories.”).
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individual—whether by mediating conflict, encouraging
compliance, tie-breaking, generating trust, or some other
process. 14 Procedure serves this purpose whether it is
constrained by substantive rights that limit group decisionmaking or by institutional designs meant to counter-balance
group conflicts, or through hybrid mechanisms that draw
from both. 15
But procedure is more than instrumental to democratic
life. 16 Procedure also has intrinsic value for each individual
member of the polity who holds a right to participate,
because it confers dignity upon the right holder, instantiates
that member’s equal status under law, and accords respect
separate and apart from the end result of exercising the
procedural right. As Laurence Tribe has written in an
analogous context, “In most areas of human endeavor—from
performing a symphony to orchestrating a society—the
processes and rules that constitute the enterprise and define
the roles played by its participants matter quite apart from
any ‘end state’ that is ultimately produced.” 17
14. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, An “Indispensable Feature”?
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 23
(2002) (“Rather than having substantive theories of justice, we must also consider
the forms of politics and how politics ought to be conducted in a world in which
people continue to disagree about basic questions of justice.”).
15. See Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1099, 1102 (2005) (reviewing RICHARD H. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE (2003))
(discussing the rights-structure debate of the law of democracy); cf. Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by “Election Law” Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1173, 1173 (1999) (discussing “the distinct ways in which rights and political
structures, as well as courts and legislatures, come together in the complex legal
construction of the institutions and laws governing the political process”).
16. See Paul MacMahon, Proceduralism, Civil Justice, and American Legal
Thought, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 545, 560 (2013) (“Procedure may matter to a
proceduralist because of its instrumental effects, or because procedure is valuable
in its own right.”).
17. Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity:
The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 631 (1973); see
also Becca Rothfeld, The Fate of the Self in the Age of Clicks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/24/books/review/the-fate-of-the-self-inthe-age-of-clicks.html (stating that “most people enjoy games because they value
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of
democracy to its standing jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court
repeatedly has recited that the Article III requirement
reflects “concern about the proper—and properly limited—
role of the courts in a democratic society.” 18 Significantly,
however, the Court’s focus on the democratic demand for a
limited judiciary seems to have crowded out other democratic
concerns that ought to be relevant to the standing inquiry. 19
Putting to the side whether the Court takes seriously its
rhetoric of a limited role, 20 the Court has never sufficiently
explained what “democratic society” means as it relates to
Article III standing or why it requires excluding from its
definition of Article III injury the violation of congressionally
conferred procedural rights. On some occasions, the Court
seems to equate democratic society with “our kind of

the process, not just the outcome, of playing,” and that “‘[i]n this respect, games
resemble most of our cherished ventures”).
18. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
19. The emphasis on a limited judiciary is aligned with the familiar academic
“obsession” with whether judicial review is a democratic practice. See, e.g., Barry
Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002). The Court’s
countermajoritarian role, and the need for judicial restraint, threads through a
great deal of legal commentary that is critical of the Court’s enforcement of
equality rights, supported by arguments that rest on considerations that include
the asserted lack of neutral justification for the enforcement of such rights, see
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 34–35 (1959); the lack of institutional capacity to declare or enforce
equality rights, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); and the indeterminacy of rights
overall, see generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997).
20. See Stefanie A. Lindquist, Joseph L. Smith & Frank B. Cross, The
Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of Activism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 103, 105
(2007) (presenting results of an empirical study of Supreme Court decisions from
1986 to 2004, and concluding that “restraint was contingent on the source of the
law at issue” and reflected “a conservatism that is particularly critical of
congressional power”).
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government,” 21 or “our system of government”; 22 on other
occasions, democratic society disappears and is displaced by
“the idea of separation of powers.” 23 These phrases, resonant
with Legal Process norms, 24 neither support nor justify the
Court’s approach to standing and procedural rights. 25 The
Constitution draws no distinction between statutorily
created
procedural
rights
and
those
considered
26
and it is not obvious why a legislative
substantive,
commitment to the procedural means for forming and
effectuating policies deserves less constitutional or judicial
respect than the substantive ends achieved by those
procedures. Conceding reasonable disagreements about the
procedural rights that democracy requires, 27 once procedural
21. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill,
699 F.2d 1166, 1178–79 (Bork, J., concurring) (“All of the doctrines that cluster
about Article III—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question,
and the like—relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea,
which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about
the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”)).
22. Id. at 750 (“The case-or-controversy doctrines state fundamental limits on
federal judicial power in our system of government.”).
23. Id. at 752 (stating that “the law of Art. III standing is built on a single
basic idea—the idea of separation of powers”).
24. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler
Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994) (discussing Legal Process norms and
dominant approaches to justiciability doctrine).
25. For a criticism of the Court’s reliance on separation of powers as a
rationale for narrowing standing doctrine (without discussing procedural
standing), see Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1508 (1988) (arguing that standing
doctrine, by eliminating opportunities for participation, constitutes “an
affirmation of authoritarianism in the guise of democracy; it is a denial of selfgovernance”).
26. Cf. Robert J. Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna
Doctrine & Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIA. L. REV. 475, 533 (2005) (Condlin
explains that, in the context of federal choice-of-law rules, “the Constitution only
permits the substance/procedure obligation to be imposed; it does not require it.
The obligation itself comes from federal statutes.”).
27. See infra Part I. This is not to deny that questions about democratic
procedure are “sufficiently different” from questions about democratic substance
as to warrant a distinct analysis. See Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the
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rights are created through a valid democratic process, those
procedural rights are rights on a par with others; the Court
is flatly wrong in claiming authority to erase those rights
from the category of rights that can be enforced through the
Article III courts, and it acts undemocratically in doing so.
The voluminous literature on standing so far has not
fully explored the democratic significance of the Court’s
treatment of “procedural rights in vacuo.” 28 Rather, most
commentators either have criticized the requirements that
the Court has devised for procedural standing, 29 or focused
Devices of Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1326, 1328 (1994) (stating that “it is
worthwhile to think of the constitutional theory relating to textually
undetermined questions of democratic procedure as somewhat distinct from the
constitutional theory relating to textually undetermined substantive rights such
as the right to privacy and the right to travel” (footnotes omitted)).
28. Scholars in various fields have criticized perceived democratic deficits in
aspects of the Court’s constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., David Schultz, The Case
for a Democratic Theory of American Election Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
259, 260 (2016) (stating that the Court’s election-law jurisprudence has “failed to
appreciate the plethora of democratic values embedded within its decisions”);
Burt Neuborne, Response to Professor Gardner: Is There a Theory in This Class?,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1519, 1520 (2003) (stating that the Court’s election-law
decisions lack any “thoughtful normative conception of democracy,” and arguing
that it is instead a “rootless muddle”); see also Richard H. Pildes, Formalism and
Functionalism in the Constitutional Law of Politics, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1525, 1528
(2003) (stating that the Court’s decisions adhere to constitutional formalism
without regard to “the point and aims of democracy”). Brief mention is made of
Article III standing and democracy in Robert C. Hughes, Judicial Democracy, 51
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 19, 63 (2019) (“To the extent that the standing doctrine is open
to interpretation, courts should consider citizens’ individual and collective
interest in having a public response to reasoned arguments for interpreting the
law (including the Constitution) in one way rather than another.”), and Jonathan
R. Siegel, What If the Universal Injury-in-Fact Test Already Is Normative?, 65
ALA. L. REV. 403, 413–14 (2013) (discussing the irony of the Court’s refusing, “in
the name of democracy,” to enforce statutes because the alleged violation does
“not fall differentially upon particular individuals”). The relation of legislature
and legislator standing to democratic life is beyond the scope of this Article. But
see generally Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional Standing to Sue: The Role of Courts
and Congress in U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 93 IND. L.J. 845 (2018).
29. See generally, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing
Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169 (2012) (arguing that the
Court’s relaxation of imminence and redressability in procedural rights cases
cannot be reconciled with current Article III doctrine, and calling for a “two-tier
solution” that would accord standing when Congress has created a procedural
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on how these requirements affect specific rights, such as the
right to privacy. 30 Nor have scholars explored standing and
its effect upon process values in and of themselves. 31 And
despite a large and emergent literature on democratic
erosion, in which courts are cast variously as democratic
stabilizers 32 or as democratic “wrecking balls,” 33 analysts
likewise have not considered Article III standing doctrine as
it relates to congressionally conferred procedural rights that,
in our view, can serve to maintain and sustain democratic
norms and practices. 34
This Article seeks to fill this gap. Let us be clear: We
accept for purposes of the argument the Court’s current view
that Article III requires a showing of injury to meet standing
requirements and that the injury must be particularized and

right and plaintiff falls within the zone of interests of the statute); Kimberly N.
Brown, Justiciable Generalized Grievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221 (2008) (treating
procedural rights standing cases as public actions not subject to the conventional
Article III inquiry).
30. See, e.g., Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL
L. REV. 439, 439 (2017) (“Article III standing has emerged as a major barrier to
federal court litigation for plaintiffs who assert a violation of their privacy
rights.”).
31. See, e.g., Bertrall Ross, Partisan Gerrymandering, the First Amendment,
and the Political Outsider, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2187, 2187, 2215–16 (2018)
(discussing the Court’s treatment of representational harm as a generalized
grievance, and not injury sufficient to support standing to challenge state
partisan gerrymandering); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276,
2277 (1998) (arguing that “any coherent standing doctrine must necessarily be
derived from a more robust substantive theory of the permissible role of race in
politics than anything the Supreme Court has offered”).
32. See generally, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Judicial Review in Troubled
Times: Stabilizing Democracy in a Second-Best World, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2019).
33. See, e.g., David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive Judicial Review:
Courts Against Democracy, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1313, 1375 (2020).
34. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, The Jurisprudence of Anti-Erosion, 66 DRAKE L.
REV. 823, 853 (2018) (acknowledging that “threats to democracy can arise outside
the traditional scope of electoral contestation” and can involve “the partisan
capture of bureaucratic machinery,” but not discussing U.S. standing doctrine or
its treatment of process values as facets of such capture).
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concrete. 35 However, our argument challenges the Court’s
refusal to recognize violations of congressionally conferred
procedural rights—largely but not exclusively rights
involving public access to and participation in administrative
agency policy making—as injuries sufficient to support
Article III standing. Boiled down, we argue that the Court’s
approach to procedural injuries in its standing decisions
threatens to demote democracy twice: first, by refusing to
acknowledge that participation in self-governance is a
particular and concrete interest, causing constitutionally
cognizable injury when a right to participate is violated; and
second, by overruling a considered congressional judgment to
designate participation as such a right.
By impeding Congress’s ability to authorize individual
participation in administrative action, the denial of standing
has removed an important check on bureaucratic decisionmaking, undermining the already slim democratic
legitimacy of the administrative state. 36 And although the
Court purports to apply its standing decisions in a neutral
manner, in practice the doctrine has tended to accentuate the
concentrated power of corporate groups, to narrow the
influence of consumers and workers, and to exacerbate
entrenched structural discrimination against Black, Brown,
and poor persons. 37 Some might argue that the standing
35. In this sense, to borrow from now-Chief Justice Roberts’ famous article on
Article III standing, we are granting the Court its “donnée”—“our criticism is
applied only to what [the Court has made] of it.” See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article
III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1219 (1993) (quoting Henry
James, The Art of Fiction, in THE PORTABLE HENRY JAMES 387, 402–03 (Morton
D. Zabel ed., 1968)).
36. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017).
37. See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury
Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304 (2002) (arguing that the standing rulings of
the prior three decades show that the doctrine “not only [was] unstable and
inconsistent, but . . . also systematically favor[ed] the powerful over the
powerless”); see also Raj Shah, Comment, An Article III Divided Against Itself
Cannot Stand: A Critical Race Perspective on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Standing
Jurisprudence, 61 UCLA L. REV. 196, 198 (2013) (questioning whether the Court
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decisions we discuss pose little threat to democracy, because
the other branches of government have been or will be able
to compensate for any harms that flow from the Court’s
approach. But there’s the rub. The Court purports to ground
its standing decisions in Article III of the Constitution, and,
as such, indirectly limits Congress’s power to enact
legislation under both Article I and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment that can be judicially enforceable. 38
These decisions thus make it more difficult for Congress to
mitigate the detrimental effects of the Court’s standing
doctrine, 39 for in many situations Congress no longer can
enact substitute legislation—there is no “constitutional
workaround.” 40 The question addressed in this Article thus
clearly has democratic significance beyond the technical
details of federal jurisdiction and the abstruse doctrine of
standing.
Part I sets out the background assumptions about
democracy, procedure, and democratic procedure as they
relate to the argument. Although some would argue that
democracy embraces no more than periodic elections and a
rule of majoritarianism, we assume that democracy in
America comprises and demands a more robust set of
practices—not only the right to vote, but also rights to
participate in the formation and effectuation of the policies,

has applied its procedural standing doctrine equally to white litigants and people
of color).
38. See infra Part II.
39. For a discussion of congressional evasion of constitutional limits in the
context of administrative lawmaking, see, for example, Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 755 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (quoting INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)) (stating that the danger of “congressional
action that evades constitutional restraints . . . is not present when Congress
delegates lawmaking power to the executive or to an independent agency”); see
also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2103 (2002) (discussing statutes that “may appear to evade
the formal lawmaking requirements” of Article I).
40. The phrase comes from Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87
TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009).
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practices, and values that bind members of the polity. 41
Moreover, even if democracy does not in all situations
require these participatory and effectuation rights, once the
polity through a valid process has agreed to establish such
rights, they hold intrinsic value for the right holder without
regard to their instrumental effects.
Part II turns to the Court’s standing jurisprudence and
focuses on the Court’s approach to congressionally created
procedural rights as a basis for showing the “injury in fact”
needed to establish constitutional standing. The Court’s
decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute 42 marked a
significant doctrinal shift—the moment the Court introduced
the idea that rights of public participation in governance are
mere procedural rights “in vacuo,” of no Article III value even
when Congress has devised such rights to promote
democracy and, indeed, to counter power imbalances that
threaten democratic values. 43 This Part surfaces the
conceptual difficulties with the Court’s reliance on a
substantive-procedural distinction and its formal and
reductionist equation of “substantive” with “concrete,” and
“procedural” with “abstract.” Briefly tracing the post-New
Deal evolution of standing doctrine to accommodate the
assertion of legislatively created rights and interests, this
Part shows how the Court’s disregard of the intrinsic worth
of process in terms of equality, dignity, and respect has
blocked individuals from enforcing the participatory rights
conferred upon them by Congress to enhance democratic
practice.
Part III assesses the Court’s procedural standing
decisions using the markers of democratic decline identified
by leading theorists of the topic. Those markers include

41. Cf. Amartya Kumar Sen, Democracy as a Universal Value, 10 J.
DEMOCRACY, no. 3, July 1999, at 3, 9 (1998) (“Democracy is a demanding system,
and not just a mechanical condition (like majority rule) taken in isolation.”).
42. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
43. Id. at 496–97.
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reduced accountability, increased inequality, and narrowed
avenues for participation. The Article then broadens the lens
from Article III and shows that the Court’s devaluation of
intrinsic process values in its standing cases is not an
isolated feature of its decision-making. Rather, the Court’s
approach to procedural standing forms a piece with what
commentators have called a “counterrevolution” in the
Court’s protection of procedural rights that dates from the
end of the Warren Court—a trend that has displaced public
rules of procedure with private rules of contract, impeded
efforts at collective action, and suppressed dignity interests
in favor of the narrowly “efficient” result. 44 Moreover,
although the Court defends its standing and other
procedural decisions as consistent with, and indeed required
by, a principle of neutrality, in practice these cases show a
manifest political valence that has amplified the influence of
corporations and the wealthy, while entrenching racial and
gender inequities.
We briefly conclude. The threat posed by the Court’s
procedural standing decisions is not simply Lochner redux. 45
The problem is the Court’s steady dismantlement of the
procedures that constitute democratic institutions. By
denying Congress the power to create procedural rights of
democratic access, the Court not only has ignored the
intrinsic value of process, but also has removed important
guardrails of democracy, contributing to the nation’s
democratic decline in ways that are difficult to measure, but
nevertheless are perilous and significant.

44. Use of the term “counterrevolution” to describe the Court’s approach to
process values seems to have first appeared in Richard S. Pierce, Jr., The Due
Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996).
45. Cf. Metzger, supra note 36, at 32.
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DEMOCRACY, PROCEDURE, AND DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE

This Part sets out the concepts that inform the
argument: democracy, procedure, and democratic procedure.
The literatures on these subjects, philosophical as well as
legal and political, are large, in dialogue with each other, and
often in disagreement. They reflect the fact that democracy
is a notoriously contested concept. 46 Analysts discuss
democracy from different perspectives, many of which have
been criticized as idealized, 47 romanticized, 48 or
essentialized and lacking any institutional—or social,
economic, political, temporal, or cultural—context. 49
Procedure likewise is complicated by boundary problems; 50
the substance-procedure distinction has been called
“notoriously problematic.” 51 There is no consensus on which
procedures are optimal for democratic life or the nature,
scope, or design of democratic procedure. 52 This Part can at
46. See W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in 56 PROCEEDINGS OF
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 167, 168–69 (1956) (referring to democracy as an
example of an essentially contested concept, meaning, “concepts the proper use
of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part
of their users”).

THE

47. See Issacharoff, supra note 32, at 9–16 (distinguishing between “real”
democracies and “idealized” democracies).
48. See Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political
Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 808
(2014).
49. See Paul Frymer, Distinguishing Formal from Institutional Democracy,
65 MD. L. REV. 125 (2006).
50. See generally, e.g., Edgar H. Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the
Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L. REV. 392 (1941) (collecting scholarly statements on
the porous boundary between substance and procedure, and maintaining that the
context for using the terms is significant).
51. See Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV.
1011, 1022 (2010). Disagreement about civil procedure is especially dominant in
the United States. See ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN
WAY OF LAW 3 (2001) (stating that “[c]ompared to other economically advanced
democracies, American civil life is more deeply pervaded by conflict and
controversy about legal processes”).
52. See WALDRON, supra note 11, at 300 (stating that people “have their own
opinions about procedures”); see also Aileen Kavanagh, Participation and
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best gesture at the complexity and depth of the writings and
highlight the path marking ideas relevant to our basic claim:
that the violation of a congressionally conferred participatory
right injures the right holder in ways sufficient to meet
Article III standing requirements even without a resulting
injury to a non-procedural interest.
Notwithstanding the disagreements and contestation,
few would dispute this basic definition: democracy is a
political practice reflecting a commitment to be bound by the
duly adopted decisions of a group of which the individual is
a member. Joshua Cohen thus refers to democracy as an
agreement “to exercise state power . . . from the collective
decisions of the members of a society who are governed by
that power.” 53 At this high level of generality, democracy
depends on certain procedural arrangements, usually
including the right to vote, which constitute the practice of
self-governance and enable each and every member of the
polity to participate in the formation of policies by which they
will be governed. For the most part, American democracy
depends not only on periodic elections in which members of
the polity vote, but also on a principle of majoritarianism to
resolve electoral outcomes when the vote is not unanimous. 54
Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron, 22 L. & PHIL. 451, 468 (2003)
(stating that “people disagree about democratic procedures, just as much as
democratic outcomes”); Jean L. Cohen, Beyond Political Theology: Comment on
Kalyvas on Carl Schmitt, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1589, 1591 (2020) (“The choice is
not substance or process, identity or talking, democracy or liberalism. We can
never,
in
a
democratic
polity,
get
out
of
the
spiral
of
procedure/substance/procedure. Rather, one must see that the heart of democracy
is the possibility of shifting to the level of deliberation about substantive values,
to procedures, and back again, within procedural forms.”).
53. Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 95,
95 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996); see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1950) (defining democracy as “institutional
arrangements for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”).
54. See John Gilbert Heinberg, History of the Majority Principle, 20 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 52, 53 (1926) (“The term majority principle denotes a device employed
by groups for reaching decisions . . . whose members are considered equal for the
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However, majoritarianism is not the exclusive procedure for
regulating elections, 55 and it is not the exclusive procedural
device in the United States—some states (admittedly only a
few) require supermajorities for certain kinds of decisions. 56
But even accepting majoritarianism as the rule of decision,
the rule is not self-defining. Some theorists treat
majoritarianism as a counting device—as James Gardner
puts it, “the impersonal operation of its aggregating
mechanism”—while others, in the republican tradition,
emphasize the importance of deliberative processes to inform
and precede the act of voting. 57
purpose of voting, and where the opinion of the greater number is deemed
expressive of the collective will.”).
55. See Stephen Macedo, Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and
Institutional Design, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (2010) (stating that
majoritarianism “is one among a variety of decision rules that may, but need not,
advance the project of collective legitimate self-rule based on political equality”);
see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Democracy and Disagreement: A Comment on
Jeremy Waldron’s Law and Disagreement, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 37
(2002) (describing majoritarianism as a “distinct conception” of the democratic
ideal). For proposals on how to design an optimal democracy, see generally HANS
GERSBACH, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: IDEAS FOR BETTER RULES (2004).
56. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in
State Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859, 888 (2021) (explaining that states
largely have eliminated supermajority requirements, where “[t]oday, only four
states have supermajority requirements”). Relatedly, jury decision-making
illustrates the limits of applying the principle of majoritarianism to democratic
procedure. Although some commentators endorse a rule of proportional
representation for the selection of jurors, others endorse random selection as a
way to secure either first-order or second-order diversity. Compare Heather K.
Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1178–79 (2005)
(defending random selection as a way to support diversity understood as minority
empowerment within otherwise majoritarian spaces), with Jeffrey Abramson,
Second-Order Diversity Revisited, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 739, 772, 779 (2014)
(defending random selection and the principle of cross-sectional jury selection
based on a “democratic norm” requiring that “community members had a fair and
equal opportunity to be recruited onto [the] jury,” and criticizing second-order
diversity for “teaching majorities to regard jury verdicts as expressions of group
conflict”). See also Anders Walker, [Dis]integration: Second-Order Diversity and
Schools, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 21, 23 (2020) (revisiting integrationist-motivated
school assignment procedures in light of the democratic benefits of “majorityminority schools and minority spaces within majority schools” and in resistance
to an assimilationist or melting pot framework).
57. See James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. &
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Does the concept of democracy require procedures other
than the right to vote? Some democratic theorists stop at the
ballot box; as Corey Brettschneider observes, “There is
debate over what else besides the right to vote counts as a
procedural right.” 58 Without resolving this question,
procedural minimalism does not describe the practice and
tradition of democratic procedure in the United States, which
by constitutional text, political custom, and judicial
precedent afford participation rights beyond the ballot box
and at different institutional entry points. Democracy in
America assumes that members of the polity share in the
creation and establishment of the policies and values by
which they are governed, and these policies and values
include the procedures used to reach many basic decisions.
Indeed, as Allen Buchman more generally has asked, “[I]t is
not clear why equality demands only that each citizen has an
‘equal say’ over ends, not over means, since the choice of
means may not only be crucial for whether the ends are
achieved but also can both express and have an impact on
the most fundamental interests and values that persons can
have.” 59 In addition to the vote, 60 the Constitution recognizes
MARY BILL RTS. J. 927, 934–36 (2011) (distinguishing between liberal/aggregative
and republican/deliberative models of democracy); see also C. Edwin Baker, Is
Democracy a Sound Basis for a Free Speech Principle?, 97 VA. L. REV. 515, 520–
21 (2011) (explaining that many theorists believe “that democratic processes are
legitimate only if limited in various ways, especially by guarantees of individual
rights that restrict the domain of popular decision making”); John J. Worley,
Deliberative Constitutionalism, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 431, 431–33 (stating that
“[D]emocratic principles enjoy greater prestige today than perhaps at any time
in the history of political ideas, yet democratic theorists still disagree about the
meaning and justification of democratic ideals and about what legal, political,
and social institutions those ideals require,” and distinguishing among
“procedural democrats,” “deliberative democrats,” and “constitutional
democrats”).
58. See Corey Brettschneider, Balancing Procedures and Outcomes Within
Democratic Theory: Core Values and Judicial Review, 53 POL. STUD. 423, 439 n.1
(2005); see also Gardner, supra note 57, at 928 (stating that “Americans so often
reductively equate democratic politics with voting”).
59. Allen Buchanan, Political Legitimacy and Democracy, 112 ETHICS 689,
711 (2002).
60. On the right to vote, see HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO,
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the right to petition (and the cognate rights of freedom of
speech and press), 61 the right to the writ of habeas corpus, 62
the jury right in some criminal and civil cases, 63 and the
right to due process before the government’s taking of liberty
or property. 64 Further, the Constitution authorizes the
establishment of federal courts that enable disputants to
participate in judicial proceedings. 65 Rules of procedure,
enacted by Congress and by the Supreme Court with
authority delegated by Congress, are said to distinguish
judicial proceedings from those of autocratic decisionGETTING BY: ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR PEOPLE WITH LOW
INCOME 849 (2019) (“The federal Constitution secures the right to vote on behalf
of ‘qualified voters . . . in conformity to the requirements of state law’ subject to
federal regulation.” (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 310, 314 (1941)
(interpreting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2))).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the
right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”);
see Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition
Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 155 (1986) (“The
right of petition, so fundamental in colonial politics was included in the Bill of
Rights. That the Framers meant to imply a corresponding governmental duty of
a fair hearing seems clear given the history of petitioning in the colonies and the
colonists’ outrage at England’s refusal to listen to their grievances.” (footnotes
omitted)).
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.”).
63. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII; see Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as
Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 218 (1995) (Amar
states that “the jury’s function in the federal constitutional scheme was not
limited to the protection of individual litigants. Rather, the jury was an essential
democratic institution because it was a means by which citizens could engage in
self-government.”).
64. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
65. See Richard Marcus, A Common Law Perspective on the Supreme Court
and Its Functions, 81 STUDIA IURIDICA 15, 37 (2019) (observing that “the
procedural authority of the US Supreme Court is too often overlooked, but it is a
supreme authority that can only be changed by Congress, or by the rules process
over which the Court has the final word”). Debate persists on the appropriate mix
of legislative and judicial authority to make rules for court practice. See Helen
Hershkoff & Arthur R. Miller, Celebrating Jack H. Friedenthal: The View of Two
Co-Authors, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 25–29 (2009) (discussing some of these
disputes, for example, with respect to the development of rules of evidence).
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makers, faux legislators, or mere bureaucrats 66 and, some
commentators argue, ensure that the courts function as
democratic institutions. 67 Whether or not democracy
demands each of these procedural rights, Congress has
sufficient authority to confer rights of participation on
individuals that go beyond ballot access. 68 This view of the
Article I power follows, conceptually and logically, from the
Constitution itself, which, as Cass Sunstein has posited,
recognizes that “[s]elf-government is a good in itself.” 69
Congress’s power to create participatory rights extends not
only to the courts, but also to legislative tribunals and to
administrative agencies. Indeed, many would argue that the
democratic bona fides of the administrative state depends
upon procedures that enable individuals to receive
information about government activity, to express views to
government decision-makers, and to help shape the
regulatory decisions that indirectly govern ordinary
conduct. 70 These different modes of participation, at all levels
66. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353, 364 (1978) (“[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies
in the fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in
the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in
his favor.”); Michael Bayles, Principles for Legal Procedure, 5 L. & PHIL. 33, 36
(1986) (stating that “[i]n considering principles for legal procedure, it is important
to have a clear notion of adjudication as distinguished from legislation,
negotiation, and so on”).
67. In this Article, we do not address the different conceptions of the relation
between courts and democracy. See, e.g., Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as
Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 320 (1997) (arguing that “adjudicative
lawmaking can, under certain conditions, claim democratic legitimacy by
ensuring constructive participation through interest representation”).
68. As Justice Reed famously stated in his concurring opinion in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, “[N]o one doubts federal power over procedure.” 304
U.S. 64, 92 (1938).
69. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 6
(2001).
70. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (associating the requirements of due process with judicial review of
administrative decision-making). But see JERRY L. MASHAW, REASONED
ADMINISTRATION AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY: HOW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 179 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2018) (“I am
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of government and in the states as well as the federal system,
are a customary part of democratic life in the United States
as it operates in lived experience. Political participation thus
can and does “take many forms: financial contributions to
candidates, political parties, and advocacy groups; petition
signing; political speech and debate; communication with
and lobbying of officials; attending public meetings; holding
office; and any of a host of other obligations of citizenship.” 71
Does democracy demand more than the procedures by
which it is constituted? Some theorists place primary if not
exclusive emphasis on democracy as pure process, 72 viewing
democratic procedure separately from democratic substance,
or what Frank Michelman in a related context has called
“proceduralism . . . all the way down.” 73 This position asserts
that democracy requires no more than procedures that are
open, fair, and equally available to all members of the
polity—the principle of democratic legitimacy—leaving the
hard pressed to conclude that administrative lawmaking in the American
national government is ‘undemocratic’ when the legal requirements for and
practices of administrative policymaking are compared with realistic alternative
modes of action.”).
71. Gardner, supra note 57, at 928; see also NANCY BERMEO, ORDINARY PEOPLE
EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: THE CITIZENRY AND THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRACY 4
(2003) (“Voting and taking collective action are essential elements of democratic
citizenship. These activities are also essential to the fate and quality of
democratic regimes because political and military leaders judge the risks of
democracy by looking at how ordinary people use the freedoms that democracy
affords.”).

IN

72. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1st ed. 1971) (justifying the
importance of “fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. The
aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory.”).
73. See Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy: The 1996-97 Brennan
Center Symposium Lecture, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 399, 405 (1998) (discussing Robert
Post’s theory of responsive democracy and calling it “bottomlessly procedural,
resting on no substantive foundation and implying no substantive
presupposition”); see also C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST.
COMM. 251, 264 (2011) (Baker says, a “procedural theory that asserts that
democracy implies authority to decide any question by ‘majoritarian processes,’
whatever these processes are, . . . overtly question begging. Why accept a mere
procedural theory? And how does one determine and why should one accept
specific majoritarian processes?”).
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substantive outputs resulting from these procedures to the
participants themselves (the principle of democratic
outcomes). 74
Whether democratic procedures are sufficient for
democracy without regard to democratic outputs is a
question separate from whether democratic procedure can be
designed without regard to substantive values. 75 Intuitions
suggest that voters in the United States would be loath to
have an election decided by the roll of the dice (except,
perhaps, to break a tie) 76 or by Shirley Jackson’s lottery. 77
Relatedly, when a federal judge resolved a discovery dispute
by ordering the participants to play “rock, paper, scissors” on
the courthouse steps, a quiet sense of outrage was registered

74. See generally Thomas Christiano, The Authority of Democracy, 12 J. POL.
PHIL. 266 (2004) (discussing the distinction between the “quality” of democratic
outcomes and the “quality of the procedure” by which democratic decisions are
made).
75. See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with
Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 509 (2003)
(calling pure process an “incomplete” account); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063,
1064 (1980) (“The process theme by itself determines almost nothing unless its
presuppositions are specified, and its content supplemented, by a full theory of
substantive rights and values—the very sort of theory the process-perfecters are
at such pains to avoid.”).
76. See Frank I. Michelman, Why Voting?, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 985, 998 (2001)
(“Let us ask: What causes (so to speak), or grounds, the justice of letting the
outcome of a crapshoot be decided by a true application of the rules of craps? It
isn’t, surely, the crystalline beauty or egalitarian perfection of those rules or of
the game they constitute. It is, surely, the desire and free agreement of the
players of the game to play that game. And agreement—consent—as a ground of
justice surely is not a purely procedural notion. It is rather an intuition closely
tied to some notion we have of human purposes or human flourishing—of human
freedom, dignity, autonomy, responsibility.” (footnotes omitted)). On the use of
the roll of the dice to break a tie in an election, see, for example, Patricia D.
Cafferata, Occasionally Lady Luck Decides Elections in Nevada, NEV. LAW., Sept.
2012, at 21, 23.
77. See Shirley Jackson, The Lottery, NEW YORKER (June 26, 1948),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1948/06/26/the-lottery; see also Zaid
Ibrahim Ismael & Sabah Atallah Khalifa Ali, Human Rights at Stake: Shirley
Jackson’s Social and Political Protest in “The Lottery,” 7 INT’L J. APPLIED
LINGUISTICS & ENG. LITERATURE, no. 6, Nov. 2018, at 28, 28.
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even on practitioner blogs. 78
These simple examples suggest that maintaining
democratic practice requires not only procedures, but also
procedures that are informed by and take account of
democratic values—values that often are identified as
equality, dignity, and respect. 79 To borrow from Robert S.
Summers,
Put in affirmative terms, a law-applying process that is
procedurally rational, humane, and respectful of individual dignity
and personal privacy is good in those respects as a process, quite
apart from whether it is also an efficacious means to good results
(just convictions, just acquittals, etc.). For procedural rationality,
humanity, and regard for dignity and privacy are “process values.” 80

A procedural system that fails to attend to these process
values can be thought of as a Potemkin Village—a façade of
rule-formalism that is likely to burden participation, impede
authentic expression, and magnify inequality, and so overall
subvert rather than promote democratic life. 81 James Allan
offers the provocative example of a majoritarian voting
process carried out by “people raising their hands in the
presence of men with machine guns” and “voting by secret
ballot but with the votes counted by unscrutinised
henchmen.” 82 As more typical examples, commentators have
78. Avista Mgmt., Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 6:05-CV-1430ORL-31JGG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38526, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2006); see
also “Rock, Paper, Scissors” . . . Everyone Loses, NEWMAN FERRARA LLP (June 16,
2006),
https://www.nyrealestatelawblog.com/manhattan-litigation-blog/2006
/june/-rock-paper-scissors-everyone-loses/.
79. Cf. Corey Brettschneider, The Value Theory of Democracy, 5 POL. PHIL. &
ECON. 259, 261 (2006) (seeking to demonstrate “that a core set of substantive
values implicitly underlies pure procedural theories of democracy” identified as
“equality of interests, political autonomy, and reciprocity” on the view that they
“are central to the ideal of democracy because they support the notion of
democratic citizens as free, equal, and reasonable rulers”).
80. Summers, supra note 5, at 3.
81. For a discussion of the establishment of procedure devoid of democratic
process values, see generally, for example, Karl Loewenstein, Law in the Third
Reich, 45 YALE L.J. 779 (1936).
82. James Allan, Thin Beats Fat Yet Again: Conceptions of Democracy, 25 L.
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raised democratic concerns about procedures that require
meetings to be open to the public, but allow them to be
scheduled at times when community members are at work or
engaged in family care; 83 initiative processes that allow only
unpaid volunteers to solicit signatures; 84 and burdens of
proof that depend on expert evidence that is priced out of
reach for lesser-resourced litigants. 85 To ensure functional
and not merely formal rights of participation, 86 the polity
may choose to take what John Rawls has called
“compensating steps” 87 and enact procedures that are
designed intentionally to rectify power imbalances and other
inequalities that threaten and could destabilize democratic
governance. 88 These forms of procedure can be seen as a
“small-p” 89 version of the representation-reinforcement
theory that John Hart Ely drew from Carolene Products

& PHIL. 533, 552 (2006).
83. See Grant Glovin, Power and Democracy in Local Public Participation
Law, 51 URB. LAW. 43, 61–62 (2021); see also ARIEL C. ARMONY, THE DUBIOUS
LINK: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION 4 (2004) (building on case
studies of Weimar Germany, the antisegregation movement in the United States,
and contemporary Argentina to argue that “[f]or civil society to develop its
democratic potential, it must be firmly rooted in and backed by the Rule of Law”
and ensure that participation not “work as a multiplier of inequalities”).
84. See Richard J. Ellis, Signature Gathering in the Initiative Process: How
Democratic Is It?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 35, 47 (2003).
85. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees:
The Right to Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1163 (discussing
the impact of the “costs of the legally optional, yet practically essential, equipage
often needed for an effective presentation once the case is filed” in court).
86. Kavanagh, supra note 52, at 481 (discussing decisions made in
“appreciation of the gap between formal and substantial equality”).
87. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 225 (1971), quoted in Kavanagh, supra
note 52, at 481.
88. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRATIC AGAINST DOMINATION ch. 5 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2017) (discussing how to design and structure “actual democratic
institutions” to avoid economic domination and to “rebalance political power”
(emphasis in original)).
89. See generally Joseph Landau, Process Scrutiny: Motivational Inquiry and
Constitutional Rights, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2147 (2019) (using the term “small-p
process” in a different context).
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footnote four. 90 As legislatively conferred rights, such
procedures would stand squarely within “the formalisticpositivist framework” justified by majoritarianism and
warrant judicial respect. 91
In tension with pure process theorists are those who
ascribe only an instrumental value to procedure,
emphasizing its role in effectuating democratic goals that are
external to the procedure itself. This notion of procedure has
been described as at best “incomplete,” 92 a view that we
share; among other things, it ignores the intrinsic democratic
value of procedural rights—“the degree to which decisional
processes preserve and enhance human dignity and selfrespect.” 93 In any event, the instrumental defense of
democratic procedure can co-exist with and certainly does
not defeat the claim that procedures can be democratically
valuable in and of themselves without having any impact on
the outcome of a decision. 94 Consider, for example, why a
90. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
101–02 (1980) (presenting a process-based theory that justifies the Court’s
“policing the mechanisms by which the system seeks to ensure that our elected
representatives will actually represent”); see United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53, 153 n.4 (1938).
91. Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due
Process, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 126, 149–50 (J. Ronald Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1977). Likewise, the judicial power in a common law system
entails authority to devise procedures to protect participatory and enforcement
values. See generally id.
92. Bone, supra note 75, at 509.
93. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (1981); see also Richard B. Saphire, Specifying
Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural
Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 120–21 (1978) (defining the “inherent dignity”
of process as “the sense of dignity that springs, not from the outcomes of
governmental decisions and conduct, but from the interaction between
individuals and their government that occurs as part of the decision-making
process,” and explaining “it is inherent in the process by which decisions are
reached and conduct is affected, yet it is independent of extrinsic, substantive
outcomes”).
94. See Tribe, supra note 75, at 1070 (“If process is constitutionally valued,
therefore, it must be valued not only as a means to some independent end, but
for its intrinsic characteristics: being heard is part of what it means to be a
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violation of the right to vote is recognized to produce an
injury to the right holder, even when the casting of the
individual vote would not affect the bottom-line electoral
result:
Disenfranchisement in a general election carries with it a loss of
political power so minute that cold calculation should convince us
that our personal franchise is in practical, political terms valueless.
Yet something—the affront to our self-image as citizens, the sense
of unfairness from exclusion—has led some of us to pursue this
“valueless” privilege to participate in political decisionmaking
through every available court. Involvement in the process of
political decisionmaking, via the exercise of a right to voter
participation, seems to be valued for its own sake. 95

Samuel Issacharoff has called such an injury
“noninstrumental”; 96 Richard Pildes has called it
“expressive.” 97
person.”); see also Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of
Procedure, in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS L, at 3, 19 (James E. Fleming
ed., 2011) (defending the view that procedure is valuable for its “dignitarian
aspect: it conceives of the people who live under it as bearers of reason and
intelligence”); Edward A. Dauer & Thomas K. Gilhool, The Economics of
Constitutionalized Repossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson, and a Partial
Reply, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 116, 148–49 (1973) (describing the inherent dignitary
value of process as “the value of autonomy, of controlling the events that affect
you . . . and the respect and self-respect that come with it”).
95. Mashaw, supra note 93, at 888 (footnotes omitted); see also Peter N. Salib
& Guha Krishnamurthi, Post-Election Litigation and the Paradox of Voting, U.
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 10, 2021), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2021/
03/10/salib-krishnamurthi-election/ (explaining that economists “will tell you
that your vote does not matter,” and suggesting that a “strategy to explain the
rationality of voting is to expand the benefits of voting beyond the decisional
capacity and institutional impacts,” including affirming the satisfaction of
participating).
96. Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in
Racial Gerrymandering Claims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47, 64–67 (1996); see also
Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34
HOUS. L. REV. 289, 305–06 (1997).
97. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre
Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506–07 (1993). For discussion of the
expressive values of judicial remedies, see Rachel Bayefsky, Remedies and
Respect: Rethinking the Role of Federal Judicial Relief, 109 GEO. L.J. 1263, 1266–
67 (2021) (“Beyond changing parties’ material circumstances, another important
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Many rights of democratic procedure, instantiating the
right holder’s equality, respect, and dignity, share this
feature of intrinsic value. We emphasize, however, that to
say that process is valuable in and of itself is not to say that
process is a substitute for substance. 98 Rather, it recognizes
that rights of participation confer something of value upon
the right holder that is separate from any immediate or
anticipated payoff that might result from the exercise of the
right; they accord the respect and dignity that any theory of
self-governance worth having needs to acknowledge and
protect. From this perspective, Ed Sparer famously
explained the significance of the procedural right to a
hearing before the termination of welfare assistance
benefits. The procedural right was not a substitute for a
substantive right to adequate benefits, nor was its only, or
indeed primary, significance in securing payments that were
due as a matter of statute (although, of course, otherwise the
individual went hungry)—rather, “the particular legal right
involved a recognition of the fundamental human right of the
recipient to dissent and resist; . . . the legal right [also] was
important to movement building, i.e., to the attempt to shift
political forces so that basic social and economic reforms
could be made.” 99 Although a violation of the right might not
produce an immediate injury to the right holder’s nonprocedural interest, the violation would diminish the right
holder’s equality, dignity, and respect, and in that way cause
injury.
Rights of democratic procedure share the general
characteristic that commentators associate with the right to
role for federal judicial remedies is to express respect for parties that have
suffered dignitary harm.”).
98. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the
Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 26 (1997) (“Ironically,
formal procedural rights may hurt rather than help poor people because they
serve to mask substantive injustice.”).
99. Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the
Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36
STAN. L. REV. 509, 563 (1984).
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vote, acknowledging that not every procedure instantiates
the democratic values that we see as essential to selfgovernance. When a democratic decision is made to allow
individuals to participate in the formation or enforcement of
policy, the procedure is democratically valuable both for its
instrumental and its intrinsic worth to the individual right
holder. Violation of the right results in harm that is separate
and independent of any possible injury to the person’s other
“concrete” stakes in the situation. Yet, as the next Part
discusses, the Supreme Court apparently would assign zero
weight to a violation of a congressionally conferred
procedural right to participate, seeing no injury in the
procedural denial unless the denial separately causes an
injury to the right holder’s financial or other non-procedural
interests.
II. PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS AS ARTICLE III INJURY
This Part provides the doctrinal basis for our claim that
the Supreme Court’s procedural standing decisions have
contributed to an erosion of democratic values in the United
States. We begin with an illustrative scenario. Suppose
Congress were to create a public right to notice of proposed
agency actions, and a concurrent right of citizens to voice
their views on these proposals—views that the agency must
then consider before acting. Suppose further that Congress
were to authorize private lawsuits to enforce these statutory
rights. If a federal agency denied an individual the
congressionally conferred right of democratic participation
and that person invoked the statutory right of action to
challenge the denial, would the suit state an Article III case
or controversy resolvable by a federal court? Not long ago,
the framework for answering this question would have been
clear: invasion of a congressionally conferred right aligned
with the democratic values embodied by the Constitution
surely would have been found to constitute Article III
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“injury” sufficient to support standing. 100 But in 2009, a bare
majority of the Supreme Court appeared to answer this
question in the negative. In Summers v. Earth Island
Institute, the Court held that members of an environmental
group who invoked their statutory rights to notice of, and an
opportunity to comment on, the disposition of federal lands
by the U.S. Forest Service had no standing to contest the
agency’s refusal to afford those rights. In the Court’s view,
the statutory right of public participation was merely a
procedural one, and the deprivation of a “procedural right,”
absent some consequent harm to the person’s separate,
substantive interest, was said to cause no “concrete injury.”
Hence, plaintiffs could not seek redress in federal court for
the agency’s denial of their statutory right to participate in
the processes of self-government. 101
In decisions following Summers v. Earth Island Institute,
a divisive issue among the justices has been the nearmetaphysical one of what counts as a “concrete injury”
sufficient to give rise to Article III standing—with the Court
increasingly questioning Congress’s constitutional power to
create rights and authorize their enforcement by Article III
courts. Significantly, the Court has narrowed the kinds of
interests that Congress may choose to designate as “rights,”
the violation of which may be redressed in federal court, and
has tethered Congress’s rights-creating power to interests
with close analogues in the common law and characterized
by some Justices as “private” and not “public” rights. 102
100. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 451 (1989)
(finding standing to challenge the Department of Justice’s refusal to permit
public interest groups to scrutinize the ABA Committee’s activities to the extent
permitted under the Federal Advisory Committee Act).
101. 555 U.S. 488, 496, 500–01 (2009).
102. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204 (2021) (explaining
that in determining whether a congressionally created right is judicially
enforceable, the Court asks whether there is “a close historical or common-law
analogue”); see also William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016
SUP. CT. REV. 197, 230 (emphasizing the traditional distinction between private
and public rights, and arguing that a private right “must have one of four specific
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Consistent with this trend, the Court’s recent cases also have
drawn an increasingly strict doctrinal line around so-called
“procedural rights”—indeed, one might fairly read those
cases as approaching a categorical presumption that
“procedural rights” are by definition not “concrete.” As
Summers amply illustrates, this indiscriminate demotion of
“procedural rights” sweeps with it participatory processes
aligned with democratic governance, reflecting a narrow
conception of democratic values and the Court’s
disinclination to account for such values in interpreting the
Constitution.
Some commentators have questioned whether the
Court’s approach is consistent with separation of powers and
the deference that an unelected Court ought to afford
majoritarian politics in “our kind of government.” 103
Commentators also have raised federalism concerns about
the Court’s lack of respect for state-defined interests that
traditionally have informed federal constitutional rights. 104
We do not disagree with these criticisms of the Court’s
doctrinal approach. Our argument, however, is somewhat
different. As developed in Part I, we start from a baseline
that treats self-governance as constitutive of democratic life
and as dependent upon procedures to be carried into action.
forms,” i.e., those related to property, contract, tort, and statutory privilege). For
a critique of the early stages of this trend, see Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163,
187 (1992) (“[T]he idea that standing should be reserved principally to people
with common law interests and denied to people without such interests . . .
reflects a Lochner-like conception of public law. It defines modern public law by
reference to common law principles that appear nowhere in the Constitution.”).
103. See supra text accompanying note 21; see, e.g., Benjamin Douglas,
Antisocial Justice: Pathologies of the Standing Doctrine, 15 CHARLESTON L. REV.
37, 90 (2020) (stating that the Court’s standing doctrine has served “to undermine
the legislature”); see also Siegel, note 28, at 413–14 (explaining that the Court’s
standing jurisprudence promotes Executive and Article III power at the expense
of Congress).
104. See, e.g., Grayson Wells, Comment, What’s the Harm? Federalism, the
Separation of Powers, and Standing in Data Breach Litigation, 96 IND. L.J. 937,
940 (2021) (criticizing the Court’s standing doctrine for failing to “look to state
law when determining whether an injury is concrete”).
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Congressionally created procedural rights support selfgovernance by enabling individual participation in public life
and, as appropriate, by allowing individuals to act
collectively with others. These procedures also help to
recalibrate power imbalances in existing political
arrangements. But the procedures are not only
instrumental; they also instantiate intangible process
values—of respect, equality, and dignity—that are concrete
interests particular to each individual, the violation of which
ought to support standing. The Court takes a different view.
In particular, in Summers, the Court cast democratic rights
of participation, even when conferred by Congress, as merely
procedural rights in vacuo—treating their violation as a
generalized grievance that does not support the standing of
any individual claimant and thereby renders the right
unenforceable in federal court.
Outside of its Article III jurisprudence, the Court has
made clear that what counts as procedure—as distinct from
substance—varies upon legal doctrinal context. 105
Recognizing that the line between procedure and substance
is not fixed, 106 commentators have emphasized the Court’s
attempts at defining what counts as procedure within
specific doctrinal domains, as, for example, the conflict of

105. See, e.g., Ethan Isaac Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1805, 1829 (2003) (stating that “[a]nalysis of the substance-procedure
distinction shows that the boundary between substance and procedure varies
according to the legal context in which it is employed”); see Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1321, 1369–70 (2000) (“[C]onstitutional doctrine—both substantive and
procedural—is diverse and unruly. In crafting theories to explain either the
nature of substantive rights or the structural mechanisms through which
constitutional rights are vindicated, we should (to echo Aristotle) demand no
more uniformity than the nature of the subject matter permits.”).
106. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 559 (1949)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“Suffice it to say that actually in many situations
procedure and substance are so interwoven that rational separation becomes
well-nigh impossible.”).
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laws 107 and habeas corpus relief. 108 Yet when determining
standing, the Court has carved out a category of statutory
rights that it deems undeserving of judicial protection—
procedural rights—without ever having defined what it
means by “procedure” for purposes of Article III. The Court’s
approach, to borrow from D. Michael Risinger, “is really an
abdication of analysis, wilfully embraced.” 109 At no point has
the Court seriously considered the relation of participation
and effectuation rights to democratic practice, or to their role
in sustaining “our kind of government” that the Court
typically states is critical to its standing doctrine.
We provide a brief overview of standing doctrine,
pausing on a few points of special relevance to our argument
about the Court’s devaluation of democratic procedural
rights. To that end, we examine the state of standing
doctrine at the time Summers reached the Court and show
that the Court’s holding in Summers was not justified by
precedent. We then turn to Summers itself and raise
questions about the conception of democracy that seems to
have motivated the decision.
A. Standing before Summers
Article III, which limits the power of the federal courts
to “Cases” and “Controversies,” 110 does not refer to standing,
and the word itself did not enter the Court’s lexicon until the

107. See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933) (discussing the distinction).
108. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 105, at 1829 (discussing the proceduralsubstantive distinction for purposes of habeas corpus relief).
109. D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited with Some
Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30
UCLA L. REV. 189, 190 (1982); see also id. at 189 (“One of the most common
concepts in the last century of legal exposition in both judicial opinions and
scholarly analysis is the dichotomy between procedural law and substantive law.
Indeed, the distinction has been adopted as the appropriate test to resolve a
variety of points of controversy in various areas of the law.” (footnotes omitted)).
110. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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middle of the twentieth century. 111 This is not to deny that
the Court in earlier cases focused on threshold matters
related to standing, such as the need for a proper party,
adversarial presentation, and avoidance of collusion. 112
When a party sought to enforce a federal statute, the
question of standing typically boiled down to whether
Congress had afforded plaintiff a right of action; the Court
phrased this requirement as whether plaintiff was asserting
its own legal rights and interests, sometimes referred to as
alleging an injury-at-law. 113 But, as Chief Justice Warren
emphasized in the 1968 decision Flast v. Cohen, standing did
not, “by its own force, raise separation of powers
problems.” 114
In its 1970 decision Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, the Court seemed to
revamp its approach by introducing a new test for
determining a party’s standing, that of “injury in fact.” 115
Now, a party could establish standing to sue by showing an
111. Thus, for example, the canonical pair of standing cases, Massachusetts v.
Mellon, consolidated with Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923),
nowhere used the term “standing,” emphasizing instead the need for proper
parties, and holding that the state-plaintiff, seeking to challenge a federal tax
and spending program, “present[ed] no justiciable controversy,” and the
individual taxpayer suffered no “injury inflicted or threatened as will enable her
to sue,” id. at 480.
112. Compare Sunstein, supra note 102, at 169 (“Without a cause of action,
there was no case or controversy and hence no standing. This is an extremely
important principle. Moreover, a handful of cases in the 1920s and 1930s relied
on notions of ‘standing’ without mentioning the word.”), with Ann Woolhandler
& Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689,
691 (2004) (stating that “early American courts did not use the term ‘standing’
much,” but contending the constitutionalization of standing doctrine reflects “a
settled historical consensus about the Constitution’s meaning” that recognizes a
division between “some areas of litigation as being under public control and
others as being under private control”).
113. Lee & Ellis, supra note 29, at 176–77 (“If ‘injury-in-fact’ sounds redundant
to a layperson, it is only because the layperson does not appreciate that it
replaced what amounted to an ‘injury-at-law’ test.”).
114. 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
115. 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). The Court used that same phrase, “injury in
fact,” in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 163 (1970).
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“injury in fact” that fell within the “zone of interests”
protected by the statute the party sought to enforce, even if
the statute did not create an explicit substantive right for
that party or confer on that party a procedural right of
enforcement. 116 Data Processing did not propose any new
restrictions on Congress’s power to authorize private suits
against the government; to the contrary, the opinion
embraced the Court’s practice of entertaining cases based on
“an explicit provision in a regulatory statute conferring
standing . . . commonly referred to [as] allowing suits by
‘private attorneys general’. . . .” 117 As Justice Douglas
explained, “Where statutes are concerned, the trend is
toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest
administrative action. The whole drive for enlarging the
category of aggrieved ‘persons’ is symptomatic of that
trend.” 118 Under the test set out in Data Processing, standing
was a threshold matter, to be easily met, and distinct from
the merits. 119 Two years later, the Court confirmed in Sierra
Club v. Morton 120 that the question of standing to assert a
statutory right was “within the power of Congress to
determine.” 121 And in later decisions over the next decade,
the Court repeatedly acknowledged that the “injury required
by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing,’” 122
116. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152–54.
117. Id. at 153 n.1 (citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
(1940)).
118. Id. at 154.
119. Id. at 158 (stating that whether “anything” in the relevant statutes gave
petitioners “a ‘legal interest’ that protects them against violations of those Acts,
and whether the actions of respondents did in fact violate either of those Acts,
are questions which go to the merits”); see Caleb Nelson, “Standing” and
Remedial Rights in Administrative Law, 105 VA. L. REV. 703, 764 (2019)
(emphasizing the distinction between standing as a threshold matter and the
merits).
120. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
121. Id. at 732 & n.3.
122. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
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leaving Congress with discretion to confer rights of public
participation and to authorize their enforcement through
private suits. 123
In the years that followed, the Court began to narrow its
definition of “injury in fact”—restricting the category to
injuries it deemed “concrete” (not “abstract”) and
“particularized” (not “generalized”), and locating these
requirements within Article III. But the Court made no claim
that its “injury in fact” standard imposed any significant
constraint on Congress’s power to confer judicially
enforceable rights on individuals. 124 Indeed, the Court
continued to emphasize Congress’s wide latitude to create
interests that would give rise to standing, constrained only
by the prohibition against “confer[ring] jurisdiction on
Art. III federal courts to render advisory opinions, . . . or to
entertain ‘friendly’ suits, . . . or to resolve ‘political
questions.’” 125 Even in United States v. Richardson 126—the
signal case on non-justiciability of “generalized grievances,”
in which the Court denied a taxpayer standing to enforce the
Constitution’s command that the government publish a
regular statement of its expenditures—a majority of the
Justices would have permitted plaintiff standing to litigate
the universally-shared public grievance had Congress
authorized such an action. 127 In particular, Justice Powell’s

123. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209–10 (1972);
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–75 (1982).
124. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 253
(1988) (noting, nearly two decades after Data Processing, that while “[t]he Court
has often stated that the power of Congress to grant standing is limited by the
Article III requirement that a plaintiff suffer ‘injury in fact’ . . . when the Court
has decided actual cases involving statutory rights, it has never required any
showing of injury beyond that set out in the statute itself”).
125. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 732 n.3.
126. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
127. The four dissenting Justices in Richardson would have found standing
directly under the Constitution, with or without congressional authorization. Id.
at 197 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 202 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 235 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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concurrence expressed the view that plaintiff-respondent
Richardson would have had standing if Congress had
conferred on taxpayers “a specific statutory grant of the right
of review,” adding that the Court had “confirmed the power
of Congress to open the federal courts to representatives of
the public interest through specific statutory grants of
standing.” 128
By contrast, the Court frequently denied standing in
cases in which a party sought to challenge executive action
but did not come armed with a specific, congressionally
conferred right to sue. The pattern is illustrated not only by
Richardson, but also by Allen v. Wright, 129 where the Court
dismissed a lawsuit by parents of Black schoolchildren
challenging a federal practice of granting tax exempt status
to exclusively white private schools, a practice that was
alleged to subsidize white flight from the public schools and
thwart desegregation efforts. 130 The Court in Allen, without
128. Id. at 193, 194 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 194 (stating that
“the traditional requirement that . . . a plaintiff must allege some particularized
injury that sets him apart from the man on the street” operates “in the absence of
a specific statutory grant of the right of review” (emphasis added)). Justice Powell
explicitly pointed to Congress’s primacy at the conclusion of his opinion, stating:
I believe we should limit the expansion of federal taxpayer and citizen
standing in the absence of specific statutory authorization to an outer
boundary drawn by the results in Flast and Baker v. Carr. I think we should
face up to the fact that all such suits are an effort ‘to employ a federal court
as a forum in which to air . . . generalized grievances about the conduct of
government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.’ The Court
should reaffirm the traditional prudential barriers against such public
actions.
Id. at 196 (citation omitted) (initial and final emphases added). By characterizing
the barriers against litigation of “generalized grievances” as “prudential,” Justice
Powell acknowledged that Congress possessed the power to authorize such suits.
129. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
130. See, e.g., Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436
(1973) (discussing the role of private schools in Southern resistance to racial
integration); see also Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, School Choice and the
Lessons of Choctaw County, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6–8 (1992) (discussing the
role of government aid to private schools in impeding racial integration of public
schools).
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even a nod to its prior assertions that standing “does not, by
its own force, raise separation of powers problems,” 131 now
declared that “the law of Art. III standing is built on a single
basic idea—the idea of separation of powers,” and held that
separation of powers barred the parents’ suit to halt the
racially discriminatory use of public tax benefits. 132 But even
Allen did not question the power of Congress to create new
rights and interests that a proper party could ask the federal
courts to enforce. Rather, Allen accepted that the ban on the
adjudication of generalized grievances was a “judicially selfimposed,” “prudential component” of justiciability doctrine
that Congress could displace by statute. 133
In time, the Court’s injury-in-fact test, initially adopted
to liberalize standing, was repurposed to facilitate the
opposite result—the restriction of standing and an
aggressive assertion of judicial power relative to Congress.
Some early commentators warned of this danger. In
particular, William A. Fletcher cautioned that the Court
could not apply injury in fact “in a non-normative way” and
that its requirement as a condition of standing put the Court
on a collision course with Congress. 134 By designating injury
in fact as a requirement of Article III, the Court in Data
Processing unintentionally created the conceptual basis for
displacing Congress’s authority to define the rights and
interests sufficient to support standing, and opened the way
for a test that looked solely to constitutionalized and
judicialized definitions that Congress could not override:
If such a requirement of injury is a constitutional minimum that
Congress cannot remove by statute, the Court is either insisting on
something that can have no meaning beyond a requirement that
131. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 100 (1968); Allen, 468 U.S. at 767 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
132. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752, 766.
133. Id. at 751.
134. Fletcher, supra note 124, at 231 (“[R]equiring an allegation of ‘injury in
fact’ is not to require a neutral, ‘factual’ showing, but rather to impose standards
of injury derived from some external normative source.”).
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plaintiff be truthful about the injury she is claiming to suffer, or the
Court is sub silentio inserting into its ostensibly factual
requirement of injury a normative structure of what constitutes
judicially cognizable injury that Congress is forbidden to change. 135

The decisive turn in the Court’s standing jurisprudence
occurred with Justice Scalia’s 1992 opinion in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 136 which, we now know, initiated a
sustained and far-reaching judicial campaign of curtailing
Congress’s power to create statutory rights enforceable in the
federal courts. 137 Plaintiffs in Lujan were organizations with
members that included scientists and environmentalists.
They sued the Department of the Interior alleging violation
of a provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) that
required the Department to consult with any federal agency
considering an action that might adversely affect animals
the Department had identified as endangered. Plaintiffs
argued that the government’s failure to abide by the ESA’s
consultation requirement placed certain endangered species
at heightened risk, thereby threatening to curtail their
members’ ability to carry out professional and other study of
these species. 138 The Court acknowledged that “the desire to
use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic
purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of
standing,” but found that the injuries alleged by the
scientists and environmentalists were not sufficiently

135. Id. at 233.
136. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
137. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a
Judicially Imposed Limit of Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1170 (1993)
(explaining that Lujan seemed to be the first step in an agenda of “reducing the
permissible role of Congress in government policymaking”); see also James E.
Pfander, Scalia’s Legacy: Originalism and Change in the Law of Standing, 6
BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 85, 87 (2017) (stating that Justice Scalia, who authored
Lujan, was “only too ready to invalidate generous federal legislative grants of
standing on the ground that they violated judge-made limits on the right of
individuals to sue”).
138. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
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“imminent” to support standing. 139 More to the point, the
Court held that the “citizen suit” provision of the ESA—
which authorized suits by “any person” to enjoin violations of
the act by the government or any other entity 140—was
unconstitutional, because it allowed parties with no Article
III injury in fact to maintain an action in federal court. 141
Commentators emphasize the importance of Lujan as
marking the first time that the Court had ever invalidated a
congressionally conferred right to sue for exceeding the
judicially constructed “injury-in-fact” limitation of Article
III. 142
Lujan advanced two principles in support of its holding,
neither of which had firm roots in the Article III case law up
to that point. Most prominently, the Court held that the
“injury in fact” requirement for standing acts as a restriction
on Congress’s Article I power to authorize judicial review, at
least in private lawsuits against the government. 143 The
extent of that limit on legislative power depended in turn on
the scope of Congress’s authority to create statutory rights,
the invasion of which would supply the required “concrete
139. Id. at 562–67.
140. The Endangered Species Act provided in relevant part that “any person
may commence a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including
the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who
is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter.” 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(2002); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72.
141. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–78.
142. Pierce, supra note 137, at 1178 (Professor Pierce explains that until
Lujan, “[t]he Court had never before held unconstitutional a statutory provision
that authorized judicial review of an agency action at the behest of members of a
statutorily specified class. Indeed, the Court had consistently respected
indications of congressional intent to confer standing on individuals with
particular interests in the outcome of agency proceedings.”). Earlier, in Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), the Court invalidated a statute conferring
a right of action on designated members of the Cherokee Nation to sue the United
States in the Court of Claims to validate various statutory restrictions on
property allotments to tribal members. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART
& WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 97–98 (7th ed.
2015) (calling Muskrat a “puzzling case”).
143. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 576–78.
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injury.” On that second question, Lujan’s statement of
constitutional principle likewise moved beyond existing
precedent. While acknowledging the long-settled doctrine
that Congress could “elevat[e] to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were
previously inadequate in law,” the Court held, for the first
time, that Congress could not elevate a “generally available
grievance about government” to the status of a legally
cognizable injury. 144 This ruling broke important new
ground. Before Lujan, the Court had consistently categorized
the rule barring adjudication of “generalized grievances” as
a non-constitutional, “prudential” limitation subject to
legislative override. Lujan converted that prudential
limitation into a constitutional prohibition—an element of
Article III’s “hard floor,” unalterable by Congress. 145
Although the Lujan decision invoked separation-of-powers
principles in its standing inquiry, that justification no longer
operated as a Bickelian restraint on an unelected judiciary,
but rather as an arrogation of judicial power to negate value
and policy judgments made by the peoples’ representatives
in Congress. 146
Lujan was consequential in another way as well—
namely, its treatment of “procedural rights.” The court of
appeals had held that the ESA afforded plaintiffs a
“procedural right” to have the Department of the Interior
comply with the interagency consultation procedures

144. Id. at 573–74, 578.
145. Justice Scalia relied upon United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974), for his claim that the ban on generalized grievances was a constitutional
limitation grounded in Article III, and therefore beyond congressional alteration.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575–76. However, the fifth vote necessary to achieve the
majority in Richardson, that of Justice Powell, characterized the generalized
grievance restriction as a “prudential barrier[]” that would bar standing only “in
the absence of specific statutory authorization” of the right of review. Richardson,
418 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying notes 126–
128.
146. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
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mandated by the Act, and that the Department’s failure to
do so had caused plaintiffs to suffer a “procedural injury” for
which Congress had authorized a cause of action to seek
redress. 147 In reversing the appellate court, the Lujan
majority invoked executive prerogative: “To permit Congress
to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’
vindicable in the courts” would unconstitutionally “transfer
from the President to the courts the . . . duty, to ‘take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” 148 Moreover, the
Court held, the ESA’s citizen-suit provision, by authorizing
suits to enforce a bare “right” of citizens to government
compliance with the law—whether that “right” might be
described as procedural or otherwise—fell squarely within
the Court’s newly constitutionalized prohibition on
“generalized grievances.” 149
Notably, Lujan’s reference to procedural rights arose
solely as a response to, and rejection of, the lower court’s
suggestion that procedural rights deserved favored
treatment: that a congressionally designated “procedural
injury” might support standing even if the “injury” plaintiff
sought to redress amounted to no more than a non-concrete,
abstract, generalized grievance (as the Court characterized
plaintiffs’ challenge to the Department’s failure to engage in
inter-agency consultation). The characterization of plaintiffs’
right as “procedural,” however, otherwise did no work in the
Court’s analysis. Put another way, Lujan found the ESA
citizen-suit provision unconstitutional because it authorized
litigation of a “generalized grievance,” not because it

147. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–72.
148. Id. at 577–78 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
149. Id. at 576–77 (“The question presented here is whether the public interest
in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies’ observance of a
particular, statutorily prescribed procedure) can be converted into an individual
right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens (or,
for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to
sue.”).
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authorized litigation of a “purely procedural right.” 150
Lujan did not ask, did not resolve, and certainly did not
explain, whether the “concrete interest” required for Article
III standing could inhere in a procedural right that Congress
conferred upon individuals—or whether, in the Court’s view,
procedure categorically lacks any intrinsic value for purposes
of determining Article III injury. Justice Blackmun’s dissent
focused on this specific gap in the majority’s analysis, stating
that “[w]hatever the Court might mean . . . it cannot be
saying that ‘procedural injuries’ as a class are necessarily
insufficient for purposes of Article III standing,” and warning
that the majority was “seek[ing] to impose fresh limitations
on the constitutional authority of Congress to allow citizen
suits in the federal courts for injuries deemed ‘procedural’ in
nature.” 151 This analytic gap in the decision is noteworthy for
another reason: the majority in Lujan neither discussed nor
questioned the reasoning in Public Citizen v. U.S.
Department of Justice, 152 decided just three years earlier,
which held that a non-profit advocacy group suffered a
concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing when it was
denied procedural rights conferred on the public by the
Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Act required any
“advisory committee” to file a charter, provide notice of its
meetings, open those meetings to the public, and make other
records publicly available. As the Court in Public Citizen
explained, the exclusion from meetings and denial of
150. Id. at 573–74 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and
every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the
public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”).
151. Id. at 589–90, 601 (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Some language in the majority opinion might be read as warranting Justice
Blackmun’s concern. See id. at 573 n.8 (rejecting the idea that “the Government’s
violation of a certain (undescribed) class of procedural duty satisfies the concreteinjury requirement by itself, without any showing that the procedural violation
endangers a concrete interest of the plaintiff (apart from his interest in having
the procedure observed)”).
152. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
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information were “sufficiently concrete” for standing where
plaintiffs sought “to monitor [the] workings [of an advisory
committee] and participate more effectively in the judicial
selection process.” 153
B. Summers and Procedural Standing
To say, as Lujan held, that a plaintiff asserting a
procedural right is not excused from demonstrating a
“concrete injury” for Article III standing is entirely different
from saying that violation of a pure “procedural right” can
never in itself count as such an injury. To be sure, a
“procedural” right does not hand the right holder a free pass
through the Article III gatehouse, but neither should an
allegation of a pure procedural violation pose an
impenetrable barrier. We acknowledge that not all
procedural rights are equal—but some have inherent value,
beyond any instrumental function, so that abridgement of
the right in and of itself inflicts concrete harm. Nothing in
Lujan held otherwise. Its ruling that Congress may not
convert the courts into forums for the airing of “generalized
grievances” does not compel the conclusion that “procedural
rights” as a class confer no concrete interests and therefore
are not judicially enforceable.
Nevertheless, in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 154 a
five-member majority took the momentous, yet largely
unexplained, step of holding that a procedural injury
“without some concrete interest that is affected by the
deprivation”—what the Court called “a procedural right in
vacuo”—did not, and apparently could never, meet the
“minimum” requirements for Article III standing. 155 The
procedural rights at stake in Summers were the statutorily
conferred rights to notice of proposed agency action, the right

153. Id. at 448–49.
154. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
155. Id. at 496.

2022]

STANDING FOR DEMOCRACY

567

to comment upon proposed agency action before it takes
effect, and the right to appeal adverse final agency action in
court. In short, the rights at issue were procedural rights
that comprise conventional features of administrative
decision-making—rights
that
promote
democratic
legitimation by enabling public participation in the processes
of government. 156 These rights were first cousin to the
statutorily conferred rights in Public Citizen that the Court
held supported a finding of standing. In both cases, Congress
created a right to information, whether of documents or
notice of agency action; created a right to participate,
whether to attend an open meeting or to offer comments to
an agency engaged in policy deliberation; and created an
appeal right to seek judicial review. With hardly a remark,
the Court in Summers accorded these procedural rights no
weight for purposes of Article III standing—describing them
instead as rights “in vacuo,” unmoored from any concrete
interest and insufficient to support standing when violated.
The Court decided Summers in 2009, but the back story
dates to 1992. That year, the U.S. Forest Service proposed
regulations to eliminate existing procedural rights to receive
information about and to have an opportunity to submit
comments on certain categories of forest projects. 157 The
proposal elicited strong public comment, 158 and Congress
countered the agency’s action by enacting the Forest Service
Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act (ARA). 159 The ARA
156. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 708 (1999) (describing ways in which notice and comment
procedures “serve fundamental democratic purposes”).
157. Review of and Comment on National Forest Plans and Project Decisions,
57 Fed. Reg. 10,444, 10,444 (Mar. 26, 1992); see also Earth Island Inst. v.
Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Essentially, the proposal
provided a categorical exclusion from notice, comment and appeal for projects the
Forest Service deemed environmentally insignificant.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
158. Earth Island Inst., 490 F.3d at 691 (discussing the public response to the
proposed regulations).
159. Pub. L. No. 102-381, tit. III, § 322, 106 Stat. 1419 (1992) (codified at 16
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directed the Forest Service to administer a notice, comment,
and appeals process that would preserve opportunities for
individuals to participate in the agency’s decision-making
process. 160 The legislative history to the ARA included
statements by members of Congress that the agency’s
proposal to curtail participation rights was “a slap in the face
of democratic values,” 161 and that the goal of the ARA was to
“allow for continued citizens’ rights to participate in and
appeal decisions of the Forest Service while providing for
more timely consideration of such appeals.” 162 In June 2003,
the Forest Service issued its final regulations implementing
the ARA. 163 Contrary to the statute’s clear mandate, the
proposed regulations expanded the categories of actions
exempt from notice, comment, and appeal to cover such
U.S.C. § 1612 note), repealed by Pub. L. No. 113-79, tit. VIII, § 8006(a), 128 Stat.
913 (2014).
160. ARA § 322(a) provided:
IN GENERAL.—In accordance with this section, the Secretary of
Agriculture, acting through the Chief of the Forest Service, shall establish
a notice and comment process for proposed actions of the Forest Service
concerning projects and activities implementing land and resource
management plans developed under the Forest and Rangeland Renewable
Resources Planning Act of 1974 (16 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) and shall modify
the procedure for appeals of decisions concerning such projects.
Id.
161. Earth Island Inst., 490 F.3d at 698 (citing 138 CONG. REC. 18,112–13
(1992) (statement of Representative Richardson)).
162. 138 CONG. REC. 29,065 (1992).
163. Notice, Comment, and Appeals Procedures for National Forest System
Projects and Activities, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,582 (June 4, 2003) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. pt. 215). The Forest Service promulgated its initial ARA regulations in
1993, providing, among other things, that any agency action “categorically
excluded” from the requirement of an Environmental Impact Statement would
likewise be exempt from notice and comment and appeal under the ARA, other
than timber sale decisions. Notice, Comment, and Appeals Procedures for
National Forest System Projects and Activities, 68 Fed. Reg. at 33,585. A lawsuit
challenged the exclusion as violating ARA § 322(a), and the dispute was resolved
by a court-ordered consent judgment. See Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
316 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2003). The consent judgment required that the exempt
categories of action be subject to ARA notice, comment, and appeal under interim
rules, see 65 Fed. Reg. 61,302 (Oct. 17, 2000), and that the Forest Service
promulgate final regulations.
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matters as salvage timber sales of up to 250 acres, prescribed
fire-burns of up to 4,200 acres, and forest-thinning of up to
1,000 acres. 164 Once the regulations went into effect—
eliminating rights to notice, comment, and appeal for these
projects—the Forest Service immediately applied them. One
of those projects involved the sale of salvage timber from a
fire that had taken place in Sequoia National Forest (the
“Burnt Ridge Project”), a sale that the Forest Service
authorized without notifying the public or accepting
comments. 165
Plaintiffs in Summers were conservation organizations
(the “Conservation Groups”) and their members who “used
and enjoyed” national forests and were dedicated to their
preservation, and often voiced their views and concerns
about proposed Forest Service actions through the notice,
comment, and appeal processes that had been in effect for
decades. For present purposes, the Conservation Groups
alleged two claims: a challenge to the regulations for having
eliminated statutory rights to notice, comment, and appeal;
and a challenge to the application of those regulations to
approve the Burnt Ridge Project without public notice or

164. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Fire
Management Activities; Categorical Exclusions, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,824 (June 5,
2003) (These categorical exclusions also appeared in Forest Service Handbook
(FSH) 1909.15, ch. 30, § 31.2(11).); National Environmental Policy Act
Documentation Needed for Limited Timber Harvest, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,598 (July
29, 2003) (previously appeared in FSH 1909.15, ch. 30, § 31.2(13)). The Forest
Service published its proposed amendment in the Federal Register, providing a
60-day comment period. Further, the Forest Service sent individual notice and
invited comments from more than 160 national organizations and federal
agencies. The proposed amendment elicited more than 25,000 comment letters.
Some comments supported the proposal on the view that “the changes would
improve procedural effectiveness and efficiency,” while others opposed the
proposal, contending “the changes would reduce a citizen’s right to participate in
the project planning process.” 68 Fed. Reg. 33,582 (June 4, 2003).
165. See Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (E.D. Cal.
2005), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck,
490 F.3d 687 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Summers v.
Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
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comment. 166 The district court entered a preliminary
injunction blocking the Burnt Ridge Project and later
approved a settlement effectively removing that project from
the case. 167 Plaintiffs nevertheless pressed their challenge to
the regulations, which remained in force, arguing that those
regulations illegally dispensed with the notice, comment,
and appeal rights established by the ARA. In particular, the
Conservation Groups argued that because the Forest Service
was continuing to invoke the challenged regulations to
permit development or disposal of lands without public
notice and comment, the regulations threatened imminent
harm to the concrete recreational and esthetic interests of
thousands of the Conservation Groups’ members who “use[d]
and enjoy[ed]” national forest lands across the country. 168
In the lower courts, the government conceded that
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the application of the
regulations with respect to the Burnt Ridge Project; a
member of the Conservation Groups frequently visited the
Burnt Ridge site, had imminent plans to return, and “his
interests in viewing the flora and fauna of the area would be
harmed if the Burnt Ridge Project went forward without
incorporation of the ideas he would have suggested if the
Forest Service had provided him an opportunity to
comment.” 169 These allegations clearly met the test set out in
Lujan, that a procedural injury (the denial of the ARA’s
“procedural” right to notice and comment) must “impair a
separate concrete interest” 170 (“recreational” or “even mere
esthetic interests” in the Burnt Ridge forest). 171 But the
government argued that once the Burnt Ridge dispute had
166. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491 (1992) (“The complaint
also challenged six other Forest Service regulations implementing the Act that
were not applied to the Burnt Ridge Project. They are irrelevant to this appeal.”).
167. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
168. See Summers, 555 U.S. at 497–98.
169. Id. at 494.
170. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992).
171. Summers, 555 U.S. at 494.
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been resolved, plaintiffs no longer had standing to challenge
the regulations curtailing the ARA’s notice and comment
rights, because plaintiffs could not show that loss of those
rights imminently threatened their concrete recreational or
esthetic interest in some other forest lands. 172 The district
court rejected that defense and entered a nationwide
injunction barring enforcement of the regulations. 173 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction, with
a minor modification, on two grounds: first, that blocking
Conservation Group members from “participation in the
appeals process may [cause them] diminished recreational
enjoyment of the national forests”; and second, that the
Conservation Groups “are injured in the sense contemplated
by Congress” because the regulations bar them from
appealing certain Forest Service decisions, as provided by
the ARA. 174
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the
Conservation Groups lacked standing to challenge the
regulations because no controversy remained as to the Burnt
Ridge Project, and, as the Court saw it, no member of the
Conservation Groups had adequately alleged plans to visit a
site where the challenged regulations were being or about to
be applied. 175 This ruling should have ended the Article III
172. Id. at 491–92.
173. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 2005 WL 5280466, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
20), order clarified by 2005 WL 8176399 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2005).
174. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d at 693–94 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit
confined the injunction to those regulations that the Forest Service had invoked
to exempt the Burnt Ridge Project from notice, comment, and appeals
requirements, concluding that challenges to regulations that had not been
applied to Burnt Ridge were not ripe for review. Id. at 696 (“While Earth Island
has established sufficient injury for standing purposes, it has not shown the sort
of injury that would require immediate review of the remaining regulations.
There is not a sufficient ‘case or controversy’ for us to review regulations not
applied in the context of the record before this court.”).
175. Quoting from Lujan, the majority held that respondents’ alleged injury to
recreational and esthetic interests was too remote and speculative to support a
finding of standing: “Such ‘some day’ intentions—without any description of
concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—
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discussion, because it addressed and rejected the sole
argument for standing argued by the Conservation Groups
in their briefs and oral argument to the Court. Instead the
majority reached out to decide an issue that the
Conservation Groups did not raise: whether the “pure
procedural injury” caused by the Forest Service
regulations—the denial of their statutory right to participate
in agency decision-making—could itself count as a “concrete
injury” absent a showing that the process denial threatened
some “concrete” interest separate from the procedural
right. 176 The majority thereby placed front and center the
question posed by Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Lujan:
whether “‘procedural injuries’ as a class are necessarily
insufficient for purposes of Article III standing.” 177 Although
the majority did not definitively answer that global question,
the bottom line for the Conservation Groups was clear
do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.”
Summers, 555 U.S. at 496 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564). For good measure,
the Court recited the statement from Lujan that the beneficiary of a regulation,
as distinct from its target, faces a significantly higher burden in establishing
standing, and, in this case, the challenged regulation governed the action of
Forest Service officials, and not of environmentalists. Id. at 494.
176. Id. at 496. The Court maintained that respondents were pressing the
argument that they had standing “because they have suffered procedural injury,
namely, that they have been denied the ability to file comments on some Forest
Service actions and will continue to be so denied.” Id. But respondents
consistently disclaimed this argument, instead emphasizing that they were
basing standing on the violation of a procedural right that caused injury to their
concrete interest in “the use and enjoyment of National Forests”—the interest
that the Court already had found too remote and speculative to meet Article III
now that the Burnt Ridge Project was no longer at issue:
The government takes pains to tear down a straw man in arguing that a
procedural injury cannot support standing without a “tangible stake in the
outcome of the agency’s decision-making process.” The Conservation
Groups do not rely on purely procedural injury, but on violations of
procedural rights “designed to protect some threatened concrete interest
. . . that is the ultimate basis of [their] standing.” That concrete interest is
the use and enjoyment of National Forests.
Brief for Respondents at 46, Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2008)
(No. 07-463).
177. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 601 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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enough: what the Court characterized as the “bare
procedural injury” of being denied the participation rights
guaranteed by the ARA was not an Article III injury and did
not support standing. By the Court’s lights, the challenged
regulations did not “require or forbid” any action by the
Conservation Groups and its members; the Conservation
Groups were not “the object of the government action or
inaction” at issue; and the ARA’s appeal standards
“govern[ed] only the conduct of Forest Service officials.” 178
The Court’s analysis failed to acknowledge the obvious
ways in which the challenged regulations directly impacted
the Conservation Groups. The ARA unequivocally required
the Forest Service to provide the public with advance notice
of any decision it planned to take about timber conservation,
to consider views presented to the agency before a specific
decision became final, and to allow for appeal from an
adverse decision. Likewise, the ARA conferred rights on
members of the public, as individuals, to receive information
in the form of notice, to participate in the decision-making
process by enabling comment, and to appeal from an adverse
decision. The challenged regulations, by eliminating the
right to notice, eliminated the opportunity to receive
information essential to knowing about the agency’s planned
actions, and by eliminating the right to comment, eliminated
the rights to petition the government and to participate in
the formation and effectuation of policy. Notwithstanding
the Court’s contrary assertion, the “object[s]” and “target[s]”
of the challenged regulations were precisely individuals in
the position of the Conservation Groups and their members,
who thereby suffered the loss of participatory rights that
they had enjoyed and exercised under earlier regulations,
and which Congress had mandated the agency make
available to them. 179 Indeed, during the two years preceding

178. Summers, 555 U.S. at 493–94 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562).
179. 138 CONG. REC. 29,065 (1992). In a short concurrence, Justice Kennedy
stated:
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the litigation, the Forest Service conceded that it had
conducted thousands of actions without affording the notice,
comment, and appeal rights mandated by the ARA, and
admitted that it would continue this practice by conducting
“thousands of further salvage-timber sales and other projects
exempted under the challenged regulations ‘in the
reasonably near future.’” 180 Whether or not the denial of
these rights produced an imminent injury to the recreational
or esthetic interests of the Conservation Groups and their
members, they suffered a continuing injury to their “pure
procedural rights” to notice and an opportunity to participate
in agency decision-making processes—individual rights of
public participation that Congress explicitly conferred on
them to promote democratic governance. The Court gave no
weight at all to the infringement of these procedural rights,
which it held did not count as a concrete injury. By the
Court’s account, standing failed not because the pure
procedural harm was not imminent, but because the
infringement of these procedural rights of participation did
not count as a concrete injury.
The Court did not explain why statutory rights enabling
an individual’s participation in administrative decision-

This case would present different considerations if Congress had sought to
provide redress for a concrete injury “giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before.” [Lujan, 504 U.S.] at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Nothing in the statute at
issue here, however, indicates Congress intended to identify or confer some
interest separate and apart from a procedural right.
Summers, 555 U.S. at 501 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The ARA quite clearly
conferred a right to participate, and so it is difficult to make sense of Justice
Kennedy’s statement in light of his concurring opinion in Lujan, where he
acknowledged Congress’s power to confer rights and create causes of action for
their enforcement, at least where Congress was explicit. Arguably, Justice
Kennedy had shifted his position and now took the view that invasion of a
procedural right could not in itself produce a concrete injury.
180. Summers, 555 U.S. at 506 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). At
least one member of the Conservation Groups had a history of filing comments
and wished to continue doing so but was being thwarted by the challenged
regulations. Id. at 507.
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making processes are of lower status—indeed, of no
constitutional status—relative to other interests the Court
has recognized (such as esthetic interests) or substantive
rights that exist as common law entitlements. Indeed,
despite the significance of the Court’s holding, its rationale
spanned barely a paragraph:
Respondents argue that they have standing to bring their
challenge because they have suffered procedural injury, namely,
that they have been denied the ability to file comments on some
Forest Service actions and will continue to be so denied. But
deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest
that is affected by the deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is
insufficient to create Article III standing. 181

Citing Lujan, the Court added: “It makes no difference that
the procedural right has been accorded by Congress. . . .
[T]he requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article
III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.” 182
The existing doctrinal framework did not justify
Summers’ demotion of procedural rights. The long-settled
law of Article III standing demanded that a plaintiff have
suffered a “concrete” “injury in fact” as opposed to an
“abstract” injury or “generalized grievance”—not that a
plaintiff have suffered a “non-procedural” injury. The
conceptual counterpart to “concrete” had always been
“abstract” (or “ideological”), not “procedural.” 183 The
unstated assumption underlying Summers, that a
procedural injury in itself can never be concrete, presupposes
that procedure is valuable only for its instrumental role and
not for its intrinsic worth. These propositions are not selfevident, and the Court failed to offer any principle, let alone
a coherent one, to justify them. After all, it is far from
181. Id. at 496 (majority opinion).
182. Id. at 497 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572, 572 n.7), but this reference to
Lujan did not illuminate the basis for the Court’s holding that the denial of
plaintiffs’ participatory rights did not constitute a concrete injury.
183. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340 (2016) (“When we have
used the adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the
term—‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”).
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apparent why the sense of dignity that flows from a walk
through a pristine forest receives Article III recognition, 184
but the sense of dignity that flows from attending an agency
hearing or participating in processes of self-governance
would not—especially when Congress has identified these
interests in democratic engagement as worthy of legal
recognition and judicial protection. Nor did the Court explain
why its selection and prioritization of values should displace
those of Congress, there being no discernible constitutional
distinction between, for instance, the esthetic interests that
the Court has recognized and the interests in democratic
participation that it rejected in Summers.
Lujan, upon which the Summers Court heavily relied,
did not compel, nor even support, the result in Summers.
Lujan held only that the Endangered Species Act’s
authorization of suits by “any person” to enforce agency
compliance with the statute violated Article III’s ban on
“generalized grievances.” Nothing in that proposition
supported the sweeping conclusion in Summers that
“procedural” rights as a class are unenforceable unless
attached to some separate, concrete, non-procedural interest.
Nor did Lujan in any way decide that all statutory actions to
enforce purely “procedural” rights are by definition
“generalized grievances” and beyond the bounds of
Article III. In relying on Lujan, the Summers majority
ignored the critical differences between the ARA’s
“procedural” rights to notice and comment—to receive
information from the government and to participate in the
processes of policy formation—and the open-ended
“procedural” right, invalidated in Lujan, that allowed any
person to sue an agency “to vindicate the public’s
nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the
laws.” 185 As Justice Ginsburg made clear during oral
184. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). The Court has repeatedly
recognized esthetic interests as “concrete,” even absent specific congressional
recognition of that interest. See, e.g., id.; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
185. Summers, 555 U.S. at 497 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580–81 (Kennedy,
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argument, the ARA’s procedural mandate created for the
public “essentially a right to a seat at the table” with respect
to Forest Service timber-project decisions, and, by
eliminating the notice, comment, and appeal rights, the
Forest Service had “cut [plaintiffs] out from that seat at the
table.” 186 Yet at no point did the majority consider the
particular nature, characteristics, or import of the
procedural rights afforded by the ARA, or consider whether
Congress had made a policy judgment that these
participatory rights had value in themselves.
Moreover, the Court in Summers failed to acknowledge,
much less grapple with, two prior decisions, Public Citizen v.
Department of Justice 187 and Federal Election Commission v.
Akins. 188 In both of these decisions, the Court had upheld the
standing of members of the public to enforce congressionally
conferred participatory rights—rights that cannot
meaningfully be distinguished from those at issue in
Summers. As we have seen, the ARA gave the public a right
to information about agency action in order to facilitate
public participation in agency decision-making processes.
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
186. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13–14, Summers v. Earth Island Inst.
(2008) (No. 07-463).
JUSTICE GINSBURG: . . . I am reading this ARA statute, and it seems to
give people a right to notice, an opportunity to comment, and to undertake
an administrative appeal. Why isn’t this statute that says, interested
public, you have those rights, you have essentially a right to a seat at the
table, why isn’t this statute like FOIA, like the statute that the Court
considered in [Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998)]
. . . involving information about [AIPAC, the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee]? These were people who said . . . we are being cut out from that
seat at the table.
Id. Other than Justice Ginsburg’s comments at oral argument, neither the parties
nor any of the Justices addressed the question of whether a right of democratic
participation could constitute a “concrete” interest sufficient to support standing.
The majority and concurrence simply assumed that a “procedural right in vacuo”
categorically did not meet the test.
187. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
188. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
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Twenty years earlier, the Court in Public Citizen held that
the denial of a statutory right to information about agency
activity was a concrete injury in fact sufficient to support
standing without any further harm to a non-procedural
interest. 189 Similarly, nine years before Summers, the Court
in Akins held that violation of a congressionally conferred
public right to information concerning campaign
expenditures was a concrete injury and gave rise to standing.
Plaintiffs in Akins sought disclosure of campaign-finance
related information from the American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC) pursuant to the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA). 190 Plaintiffs sued the Federal
Election Commission, seeking an order requiring the
Commission to compel AIPAC to make the required
disclosures, which would then become available to plaintiffs
(and the public at large). 191 Justice Breyer, writing for six
members of the Court, rejected the government’s argument
that plaintiffs had suffered no concrete injury:
The “injury in fact” that respondents have suffered consists of their
inability to obtain information—lists of AIPAC donors . . . and
campaign-related contributions and expenditures—that, on
respondents’ view of the law, the statute requires that AIPAC make
public. There is no reason to doubt their claim that the information
would help them . . . to evaluate candidates for public office . . . .
Respondents’ injury consequently seems concrete and particular.
Indeed, this Court has previously held that a plaintiff suffers an
“injury in fact” when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which
must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute. 192

So, too, in Summers, the Forest Service withheld from
the Conservations Groups and other members of the public
information about administrative action to which Congress
had given them a right in order to engage meaningfully in
democratic activity. On the logic of Akins, Summers arguably
189. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–51.
190. Akins, 524 U.S. at 19–26.
191. See id. at 16.
192. Id. at 21.
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stands as a stronger case for recognizing standing. The
Conservation Groups and their members sought
enforcement of rights that ran directly to them, while the
Akins plaintiffs sought a judicial order directing the
Executive to enforce the laws against a third party. The ARA,
unlike FECA, thus posed no separation-of-powers problems,
nor did it raise the Article II, § 3 “take care” issues cited by
the dissent in Akins (as well as by the majorities in other
decisions such as Lujan and Allen) as grounds for opposing
standing. 193 Possibly the Court had decided in Summers that
rights to information carry more weight when they relate to
the franchise, as in Akins, or judicial selection as in Public
Citizen. Some might consider the statutory rights at play in
Summers—to comment about the Forest Service’s
disposition of certain public lands—of a lesser order. This
view, however, understates the democratic significance of
the ARA notice right, which, like that of the Administrative
Procedure Act, enables public participation and provides
democratic legitimation for administrative decision-making.
As Justice Thomas explained in his dissent in Department of
Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of
California, 194 notice and comment procedures “attempt[] to
provide a ‘surrogate political process’ that takes some of the
sting out of the inherently undemocratic and unaccountable
rulemaking process.” 195 In any event, the Court in Summers
193. See id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 577 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
194. 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1918–1930 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1929 n.13 (citing Asimow, supra note 156, at 708); see also Asimow,
supra note 156, at 708 (“Beyond these utilitarian calculations, notice and
comment procedures serve fundamental democratic purposes. An agency that
adopts rules makes new law without direct accountability to the voters. Notice
and comment procedure is a surrogate political process. It helps to alleviate the
undemocratic character of agency rulemaking and enhances the legitimacy of the
process. It provides a channel that allows interested persons to exercise political
power by indicating mass opposition to a proposed rule. Notice and comment also
enhances the ability of Congress and the President to provide oversight of the
rulemaking process.”). The legislative history to the APA confirms this view,
explaining that the “principal purpose” of the notice and comment requirements
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did not consider and did not explain why the agency’s
wholesale elimination of administrative notice-and-comment
rights did not in and of itself produce a concrete injury to the
right holders and instead carried no weight for Article III
standing purposes.
Summers not only eliminated individual rights of
participation; it also threatened to circumscribe Congress’s
power to enact procedural rights that the government must
respect and enforce, and it did so without serious
explanation. Merely reciting Article III provides no rationale
for the Court’s exclusion of procedural injury from the
category of harms that give rise to constitutional standing.
Article III draws no distinction between procedural and
substantive injury—it does not define injury at all—and
democratic theory would suggest that Congress, as a
representative institution, has authority to devise
procedural rights that enable participation and carry out the
goal of self-governance. 196 Moreover, the Court’s historical
practice and professed principles of judicial restraint would
seem to counsel deference to congressional judgment on such
matters. 197 Denominating a right as “procedural” fails to
is to provide a check on unaccountable agency power by ensuring “that the
legislative functions of administrative agencies shall so far as possible be
exercised only upon public participation on notice . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980,
at 257 (1946).
196. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 102, at 163 (The question of what
constitutes an “injury” is inevitably value laden and belongs to Congress, not the
courts.). This is not to deny that the Court can use its judicial power to devise
remedies and rights of participation. Significantly, however, the Court has
narrowed Congress’s power to create rights and remedies, while disclaiming its
own judicial authority to do so. Indeed, the Court’s refusal to imply remedies to
redress constitutional and statutory violations, on the ground that Congress
alone has power to devise judicial forms of relief, runs directly counter to its
refusal to defer to Congress’s decision to enact rights of democratic participation.
See generally Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary,
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003) (tracing the Court’s
narrowing approach to implied constitutional and statutory remedies).
197. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 641 (1999) (“‘Injuries’ are
not some kind of Platonic form, so that we can distinguish, without the aid of
some understanding of law, between those that exist ‘in fact’ and those that do
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supply the missing rationale for the doctrine announced by
Summers; it merely offers an ipse dixit without explanatory
power.
To compound the problem, beginning with its 2016
decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 198 the Court appears to
have extended the Summers rationale from the public
administrative context to private commercial disputes.
Spokeo, unlike the cases so far discussed, involved a private
dispute between a consumer and a non-governmental actor—
a website operator that was alleged to have published
inaccurate information about the consumer, in violation of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). 199 The FCRA requires
covered entities to maintain reasonable procedures to reduce
the risk of reporting inaccurate personal data about
individual consumers. A person whose credit report contains
inaccurate information has a right under the FCRA to alert
the offending company to the factual error and to ask for its
correction, and to sue the company for failing to follow
reasonable procedures; the statute authorizes both actual
and liquidated damages for a violation of its requirements. 200
The district court dismissed the action for lack of standing,
but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
plaintiff had alleged a violation of his individual statutory
not exist ‘in fact.’ What is perceived, socially or legally, as an ‘actual’ injury is a
product of social or legal categories giving names and recognition to some things
that people, prominently people within the legal culture, consider to be (actual,
cognizable) harms.”).
198. 578 U.S. 330 (2016). The Court has continued this trend of extending the
logic of Summers to private law disputes. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141
S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021) (holding that receiving information in a format that
violated a statutory procedural requirement does not show a concrete injury to
support Article III standing); see also Ward v. Nat’l Patient Acct. Servs. Sols.,
Inc., 9 F.4th 357, 362–63 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that defendant’s alleged
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by failing to identify itself as a
debt collector in its voice messages, failing to identify the true name of its
businesses, and failing to disclose its identity during telephone calls did not
establish concrete injury for purposes of Article III standing).
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1692p.
200. See HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra note 60, at 532 (describing the
statutory framework).

582

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

rights, not those “of other people,” 201 and therefore had
demonstrated an Article III injury in fact. The Supreme
Court agreed that the consumer had shown a
“particularized” injury—after all, the inaccurate information
pertained uniquely to this consumer—but vacated and
remanded because the appellate court had failed to address
whether the consumer had also shown a “concrete” injury,
such as lost job opportunities or impaired credit ratings. In
particular, the Court insisted that alleging a violation of a
procedural requirement did not automatically establish a
concrete injury because a “violation of one of the FCRA’s
procedural requirements may result in no harm.” 202
To support that proposition, the Court relied upon the
statement in Summers that the “deprivation of a procedural
right without some concrete interest that is affected by the
deprivation . . . is insufficient to create Article III
standing.” 203 However, a few sentences later, the Spokeo
Court allowed that “violation of a procedural right granted
by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to
constitute injury in fact,” and in such a case, a plaintiff “need
not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has
identified.” 204 Crucially, the Court supported this statement
with citations to Public Citizen and Akins, which, as we have
seen, involved statutory procedural rights to request
information from the government and/or to participate in
public decision-making processes—the same types of
procedural rights that the Court deemed insufficient to
support standing in Summers. 205 Commentators have called
201. Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 333–34.
202. Id. at 343.
203. Id. at 341 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496
(2009)).
204. Id. at 342.
205. Id. The Court stated:
[T]he violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in
some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff
in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress
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the analysis in Spokeo “puzzling,” and “unstable,” 206 raising
the concern that in future cases a regulated entity’s failure
to provide information as required by statute—the kind of
injury recognized as sufficient for standing in Public Citizen
and Akins and currently treated by at least some lower
courts as sufficient for Article III purposes 207—will be
treated as insufficient “unless such informational harm is
linked to a more concrete sequelae.” 208
Interpretive uncertainty thus surrounds the scope of the
Court’s holding in Summers that the violation of an
individual’s congressionally conferred procedural right in
vacuo does not give rise to concrete injury sufficient to
support Article III standing. The doctrine contains an
has identified. [See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25
(1998)] (confirming that a group of voters’ “inability to obtain information”
that Congress had decided to make public is a sufficient injury in fact to
satisfy Article III); [Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)]
(holding that two advocacy organizations’ failure to obtain information
subject to disclosure under the Federal Advisory Committee Act
“constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue”).
Id.
206. See, e.g., Craig Konnoth & Seth F. Kreimer, Spelling Out Spokeo, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 61 (2016).
207. See, e.g., United to Protect Democracy v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n
on Election Integrity, 288 F. Supp. 3d 99, 108, 115 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding that
advocacy group had “informational standing” under Article III to bring action
against the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity and Office of
Management and Budget, asserting a violation of the Paperwork Reduction Act,
but that the commission was not an agency under the Act).
208. Konnoth & Kreimer, supra note 206, at 58. In TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), the Court declined to characterize a regulated
entity’s failure to provide information in the format required by federal law as a
failure to provide information, holding that this violation did not provide a
concrete and particular injury sufficient to support standing without a separate
showing of “adverse effects.” Id. at 2212–14. The Court’s implicit suggestion is
that formatting errors are trivial technicalities without legal consequences. That
view upends legislative efforts to counter the adverse effects of contractual “fine
print” by mandating the size and location of information disclosure in contracts
and other documents affecting consumers, investors, tenants, and workers. See
generally, e.g., Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in
Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014) (discussing the importance
of disclosure format as a means of promoting consumer assent and democratizing
the content of form contracts).
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internal tension that potentially puts standing doctrine on a
collision course with important democratic values, and the
implications of Summers could be far reaching. 209 If a
congressionally conferred right to attend a public hearing is
merely procedural, then is the exclusion of a person from a
public meeting in violation of that right insufficient injury to
meet Article III unless it causes some separate, nonprocedural harm? Likewise, if a congressionally conferred
right to speak at a public meeting is merely procedural, then
is the refusal to place that person on the agenda in violation
of that right an injury insufficient to meet Article III, because
although particular to the person, it causes no separate nonprocedural harm? And by this logic, on what principled basis
would the right to vote—a procedural right to participate in
democratic decision-making—differ from rights to
information, rights to attend meetings, rights to comment
and express views, and rights to petition the government
during the administrative policy-making process? Is the
right to vote only instrumental in the sense of being
“preservative of other rights,” and without any intrinsic
value in and of itself? Our question is not merely rhetorical;
it goes to the core of whether the Court’s approach to
participatory rights as a basis for standing can withstand
democratic scrutiny.
III. DEMOCRATIC EROSION, PROCESS VALUES,
AND PROCEDURAL STANDING
We return to our basic claim: that the Supreme Court’s
refusal to treat violations of congressionally conferred
procedural rights as injury for purposes of Article III
209. Some lower courts already have read Summers as making public noticeand-comment rights unenforceable absent a showing that the denial of those
rights caused some independent “concrete” injury. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Haaland, 849 Fed. App’x 2, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“When
alleging the deprivation of a procedure such as notice and comment, the
complainant must demonstrate that it has also ‘suffered personal and
particularized injury.’” (quoting Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Transp. Sec.
Admin., 429 F.3d 1130, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
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standing is not simply wrong as a matter of existing doctrine,
but also wrong as a matter of democratic principle. In our
view, these decisions run counter to the “democratic society”
which is said to compel standing restrictions in the first place
and which derives legitimacy from participatory procedures.
Nevertheless, before going further, we feel pressed to ask:
Given the serious challenges confronting American
democracy—authoritarian-style
leaders,
concentrated
wealth, structural racism, government secrecy, and extreme
partisan polarization—can we seriously contend that a
picayune feature of an abstruse justiciability doctrine has
contributed to the current democratic crisis? To borrow from
Chief Justice Roberts, we say: “The short but emphatic
answer is yes . . . . ‘[I]llegitimate . . . practices get their first
footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure.’” 210
To be sure, the Court’s treatment of statutory rights of
action has not triggered a democratic crisis along the lines of
a military coup d’etat or the current assault on voting rights.
But the theory of democratic decline places less emphasis on
seismic shifts in democratic practice than on erosion or
backsliding, and it assesses changes in governance in terms
of a continuum—as “a process related to yet still distinct
from reversion to autocracy.” 211 On this view, factors that can
cause or contribute to democratic decline are defined
pragmatically as “something that makes a difference”
whether as a matter of structure or agency. 212 Thus, as Tom
Ginsburg, a leading writer on the topic, has explained, “[T]he
steps in democratic backsliding are . . . incremental . . . .

210. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 502–03 (2011) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
211. David Waldner & Ellen Lust, Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with
Democratic Backsliding, 21 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93, 94 (2018).
212. ELLEN LUST & DAVID WALDNER, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., UNWELCOME
CHANGE: UNDERSTANDING, EVALUATING, AND EXTENDING THEORIES OF
DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING 9 (2015) (prepared under a subaward funded by the
U.S. Agency for International Development).
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[T]he present danger today is not so much the sudden
collapse of democracy, but instead its erosion in a series of
small individual steps that, each on their own, may not
appear alarming.” 213 Four decades ago, Juan J. Linz
explained in his groundbreaking essay “Crisis, Breakdown,
and Reequilibration” that even when regime change can be
dated with a precise transfer of power, it is “in truth the
culmination of a longer process, an incremental political
change that has evolved over a more or less prolonged
period.” 214 We resist viewing democratic decline as a process
that is inevitable or foreordained, and instead emphasize
that the maintenance of democracy requires vigilance—an
effort that many commentators argue involves securing and
maintaining “protective guardrails” to avert or mitigate
backsliding and decline. 215
Legislatively conferred procedural rights are one such
guardrail, and standing—affording access to federal court—
extends protection when those rights are violated. By
refusing to treat these procedural violations as injury
sufficient in and of themselves to support standing, the Court

213. Tom Ginsburg, Democratic Backsliding and the Rule of Law, 44 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 351, 355 (2018). On the question of whether the distinction between
democracy and nondemocracy should be viewed in terms of dichotomy or
gradation, see David Collier & Robert Adcock, Democracy and Dichotomies: A
Pragmatic Approach to Choices About Concepts, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 537 (1999);
see also Hans Lueders & Ellen Lust, Multiple Measurements, Elusive Agreement,
and Unstable Outcomes in the Study of Regime Change (The Varieties of
Democracy Inst., Working Paper No. 2017:52, 2017), https://gupea.ub.gu.se
/bitstream/2077/53814/1/gupea_2077_53814_1.pdf
(distinguishing
between
regime rupture and regime reform, and explaining the disagreement of whether
to see democracy in a binary relationship with dictatorship or as a continuum).
214. Juan J. Linz, Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration, in THE BREAKDOWN
3 (Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan eds., 1978).

OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES 1,

215. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 2, at 214–15, 217 (stating further that
without procedural values, “our democracy could not work”). In a related context,
the writer Toni Morrison wrote: “Let us be reminded that before there is a final
solution, there must be a first solution, a second one, even a third. The move
toward a final solution is not a jump. It takes one step, then another, then
another.” Toni Morrison, Racism and Fascism, 64 J. NEGRO EDUC. 384, 384
(1995).
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has withheld federal judicial recourse from those who have
been blocked from exercising democratic rights—rights that
safeguard democratic process and preserve individual
equality, dignity, and respect. Although some commentators
have argued that the Court ought to dispense with the injury
requirement of Article III whenever Congress confers a
procedural right, we instead have made the more modest
claim that the Court ought to treat a violation of such a
procedural right as injury for purposes of Article III. 216 The
distinction is important: it goes to the core of our argument
that process values are critical to democratic legitimation.
This Part discusses how the Court’s procedural standing
decisions line up against some of the key markers that
scholars associate with democratic erosion. We then show
that the Court’s devaluation of intrinsic process values in its
standing doctrine is not a unique feature of its Article III
decision-making—rather, across the board, for at least the
last four decades, the Court has gutted democratic procedure
in ways that have reduced the public sphere, entrenched
power by race and class, and shrunk the ability of certain
groups such as workers and consumers to engage in
collective action and individual participation. Overall, we
argue, the judicial trend has been to remove or at least to
hobble some of democracy’s most important “protective
guardrails,” and, in our view, the doctrine requires an
important course correction.
A. Markers of Democratic Erosion and Procedural Standing
Theorists of democratic erosion, like democratic theorists
in general, do not share a concept of democracy or use the
same measuring devices to assess alleged problems. 217 In
216. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, The Problem with Particularized Injury: The
Disjuncture Between Broad-Based Environmental Harm and Standing
Jurisprudence, 25 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 17 (2009).
217. See Haemin Jee, Hans Lueders & Rachel Myrick, Towards a Unified
Concept of Democratic Backsliding, DEMOCRATIZATION (Dec. 9, 2021),
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particular, they disagree whether the focus ought to be only
on the right to vote and changes in the electoral process, or
whether to expand the lens to include broader participatory
opportunities as well as “liberal” rights associated with selfgovernance. 218 Despite these disagreements, we think it is
neither simplistic nor inaccurate to say that these theories of
decline all recognize a role for process and procedure as entry
points into democratic participation. 219 Moreover, these
theories converge on a few basic ideas: that the markers of
decline—even if the causal relationships are not consistently
robust 220—involve decreased executive accountability,
increased inequality and concentrated economic power, and
diminished participation by discrete sectors of the
population. 221 These markers are consistent with a
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.2010709; Lueders & Lust, supra note 213,
at 25 (“[T]oo little is known about the factors driving transition, breakdown,
liberalization, and backsliding. Debates over the role of economic conditions,
political institutions, cultural characteristics, and other potentially facilitating
factors can only be resolved when scholars consciously consider the measures
they use and seek to develop research methods that promote cumulative
knowledge building.”).
218. See, e.g., Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 87.
219. Although we focus on procedural rights and process values, we do not see
them as exclusive forms of protective guardrails; however, the role of substantive
commitments to democratic flourishing is beyond the scope of this Article.
220. On the causal relationship between democratic decline and inequality, see
Stephan Haggard & Robert R. Kaufman, Inequality and Regime Change:
Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule, 106 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 495, 495, 513 (2012) (stating that “attempts to demonstrate the relationship
between inequality and regime type have yielded only mixed results,” and
suggesting that the strength of “distributive conflict theories” may depend on the
“capacity to overcome barriers to collective action”).
221. We draw these markers from, for example, Huq & Ginsburg, supra note
2, at 86–87, and Lueders & Lust, supra note 213, at 6–7. Attention also is given
to Charles Tilly’s theory of “de-democratization,” examining the reversal or
alteration of “processes” and “mechanisms” that facilitate the democratic
capacities of the population that regularly interacts with political decisionmakers, whether those interactive relations are equally distributed, and whether
those interactions allow for consultation in matters affecting resources. See
generally Charles Tilly, Inequality, Democratization, and De-Democratization, 21
SOCIO. THEORY 37 (2003). Linz associates democratic decline with a crisis in
democratic legitimation, which can occur “when a loyal opposition” finds the
“normal methods” of dissent to “seem inadequate.” Linz, supra note 214, at 93. In
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conceptual approach that places “political freedom—i.e., selfdetermination— . . . at the core” of democracy; that extends
to all members of the polity equal “freedom of choice . . . to
decide their preferred policies and representatives”; and that
recognizes the importance of “institutional safeguards” to
protect against majoritarian or oligarchic tyranny. 222
With these markers guiding the path, we contend that
changes in the Court’s approach to procedural standing
illustrate what Steven Levitsky and others have referred to
as “little-noticed, incremental steps, most of which are legal
and many of which appear innocuous” that nevertheless can
exert significant negative effects on democratic life. 223 The
role of justiciability doctrine is particularly important in the
United States, which has long been recognized to be
“exceptional” in its emphasis on adversarial process to
resolve social, economic, and political issues. 224 Unlike
European countries that depend extensively on centralized
bureaucracies for regulatory enforcement, greater weight is
placed in the United States on affording rights of public
participation as a way to legitimate administrative action
and to overcome the serious collective action problems that
our view, the narrowing of participatory options can incrementally contribute to
this sense of inadequacy. Cf. Jee, Lueders & Myrick, supra note 217, at 4
(warning that “emphasizing larger changes can make scholars blind to
incremental democratic decline which, accumulated over time, can have
substantive effects”).
222. Jee, Lueders & Myrick, supra note 217, at 6. These authors argue that
democratic constraints function horizontally, through a network of relatively
autonomous institutions that includes the different branches of government; they
also function through extra-governmental institutions that disseminate
information and are sites of political action, both in service of accountability and
freedom from tyranny. Id. They further argue that the democratic-enabling
factors impact upon state capacity to govern. Id.
223. Robert Mickey, Steven Levitsky & Lucan Ahmad Way, Is America Still
Safe for Democracy? Why the United States Is in Danger of Backsliding, 96
FOREIGN AFFS., no. 3, May/June 2017, at 20, 21.
224. See Richard Marcus, Bomb Throwing, Democratic Theory, and Basic
Values—A New Path to Procedural Harmonization?, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 475, 482–
503 (2013) (discussing the role of civil litigation for “social change” and regulatory
improvements, and scholarly views of the practice).
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may impede citizens from participating in the creation of
policies and values by which they are bound. 225 Nor are these
legislatively
conferred
rights
confined
to
public
administrative matters; rather, Congress has created
important judicial rights of action to secure antidiscrimination norms and to protect the dignity-value of
living in racially diverse communities. 226
Congress’s creation of judicially enforceable procedural
rights carries out a policy of using private litigation in the
public interest, an interest that includes monitoring
executive action to ensure compliance with statutory and
regulatory requirements. In its strongest form, this kind of
action has been considered a species of the “private attorney
general,” 227 a practice that traces back as a legislative matter
to relator actions under qui tam statutes. 228 As we recounted
in our analysis of Summers, Congress was explicitly
concerned with democratizing administrative participation
as a means to ensure regulatory accountability in the
administration of Forest Service stewardship funds. 229
225. For a canonical discussion of the problem, see generally Richard B.
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667 (1975).
226. See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION
(2010).

AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S.

227. For a history of the private attorney general concept, see generally Jeremy
A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 1, Winter 1998, at 179; William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private
Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004);
14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & HELEN
HERSHKOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3653 (4th ed. 2015).
228. See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) (“Statutes providing for
actions by a common informer, who himself had no interest whatever in the
controversy other than that given by statute, have been in existence for hundreds
of years in England, and in this country ever since the foundation of our
government.”); Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 774 (2000) (referring to “the long tradition of qui tam actions in England and
the American Colonies”).
229. Recall that Summers involved amendments to 16 U.S.C. § 1612, in which
Congress conferred rights of participation out of a concern, among other things,
that Forest Service stewardship funds would not “accurately reflect national
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Certainly, when dealing with questions of participatory
rights, the devil is in the details. Even legislatively conferred
procedural rights may be democratically impermissible if in
design or purpose they seek to defeat rather than effectuate
substantive constitutional or statutory commitments. 230
Moreover, we recognize that excessive administrative
formality may tend toward “ossification and inflexibility of
agency process,” 231 and that not every procedural right
entails a full-blown adversarial hearing. 232 But these were
not the reasons given by the Court in Summers for refusing
to treat the Forest Service’s violation of a legislatively
created procedural right as Article III injury. Nor was the
Court asked to assess the sufficiency of the legislatively
conferred procedural right as a matter of the Due Process
Clause, which would have involved complex questions of
constitutional balancing and policy tradeoffs. Rather,
needs.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-626, at 71 (1992). In a Senate debate occurring on
August 6, 1992, Senator Fowler of Georgia spoke about Fowler Amendment No.
2902, see 138 CONG. REC. 21,989 (1992), designed to reform the Forest Service’s
administrative decision-making and appeals process. 138 CONG. REC. 21,989–90
(1992) (statement of Senator Fowler). Senator Fowler emphasized the importance
of creating a right to appeal a decision by the Forest Service, which Senator
Fowler characterized as a “democratic right.” 138 CONG. REC. 21,989 (1992).
Senator Fowler criticized the Forest Service’s new regulations, which he
characterized as imparting the following message: “These are not the people’s
forests; these are forests that we, the unelected Government, are going to decide
how they are used.” 138 CONG. REC. 21,990 (1992). Senator Fowler further
explained that adopting the amendment was the most cost-effective way forward,
as the Forest Service’s promulgated regulations would otherwise be challenged
in court due to a fundamental right to object to governmental decision-making
inherent in the concept of democracy and codified since 1907. Finally, Senator
Fowler reiterated that since Forest Service decisions concern public lands, “[t]hey
should be managed through an open public process.” Id.
230. See Luke Norris, The Promise and Perils of Private Enforcement, 108 VA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (discussing the democratic uses and misuses of private
participatory rights in administrative governance).
231. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 264.
232. See Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1268 (1975) (explaining that not every adjudicative determination requires “full
trial-type hearings,” and that some rulemaking determinations require more
than “mere notice and comment procedures”).
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Congress already had specified that some measure of
participation was democratically warranted. By giving no
weight to the violation of the congressionally conferred
procedural right, the Court improperly substituted its value
choices for the considered judgment of Congress, and
effectively disabled Congress from choosing the means to
ensure enforcement of its laws. In both respects, the Court’s
actions contributed to a loss of democratic accountability.
One might take the instrumental perspective and argue
that procedural rights promote government accountability
only if the participant ferrets out actual wrongdoing. To the
contrary, participation also serves prophylactic goals,
creating incentives for administrative regularity. An
individual’s invocation of a procedural right serves to make
issues salient in the policy-making context; it compels a
public authority to acknowledge the existence of an issue and
brings that issue, even if briefly and temporarily, to the
forefront of administrative attention. Relatedly, rights of
participation support democracy by promoting the inclusion
of discrete parties in governance and affording different
points of access into the process of policy making. By
enforcing only those procedural rights that are tethered to
concrete interests traceable to common law entitlements, the
Court’s standing doctrine tilts the legal system in favor of
those who challenge regulations and against those who are
the beneficiaries of regulation. In effect, these standing
decisions turn the theory of Caroline Products footnote four
on its head by withholding judicial protection from
legislation that seeks to unblock barriers to democratic
politics. 233 Indeed, the logic of the Court’s procedural
standing decisions—its insistence that a procedural right be
in service of a “concrete” interest—tracks precisely Charles
233. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, The New Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 109 CALIF.
L. REV. 2323, 2325 (2021) (“Far from engaging in representation-reinforcing
judicial review, the Court’s decisions contribute to ‘the ins . . . choking off the
channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay
out’ regardless of what the people would choose.” (footnote omitted)).
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Tilly’s account of the role of “categorical inequality” in a
process of “de-democratization,” in which “inequality’s
beneficiaries” are given access to “advantageous particular
relations to government agents,” and through that relation,
can “shield[] themselves from onerous obligations” and “use[]
their governmental access to extract more advantages from
unequal relations with nongovernmental actors.” 234 Thus,
even apart from the right holder’s diminished dignity,
respect, and equality, the Court’s refusal to enforce
congressionally conferred procedural rights impairs
democratic practice.
B. The Demise of Process Values and Democratic Erosion
We so far have argued that the Court’s procedural
standing decisions display many of the features associated
by political theorists with democratic erosion. Moreover, we
have shown that the Court’s refusal to accord constitutional
weight to intrinsic process values was not an inevitable
feature of Article III doctrine. The Supreme Court is, of
course, a constrained actor, but precedent did not require
deciding Summers or Spokeo as it did; the Constitution is not
hardwired with only instrumental process values. Although
some argue that democracy entails its own inevitable selfdestruction, 235 for present purposes we reject that position.
Instead, drawing from Juan J. Linz’s analysis, we argue that
democratic leaders—and we see justices of the Supreme
Court in that role—potentially “increase or decrease the
probability of a [democratic breakdown]” through the actions

234. Charles Tilly, Changing Forms of Inequality, 21 SOCIO. THEORY 31, 35–36,
41 (2003); Tilly, supra note 221, at 41.
235. See, e.g., Mark Chou, Sowing the Seeds of Its Own Destruction: Democracy
and Democide in the Weimar Republic and Beyond, 59 THEORIA, no. 133, Dec.
2012, at 21, 21 (“That all democracies have, by their very nature, the potential to
destroy themselves is a fact too rarely documented by the acolytes of
democracy.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1405, 1409 (2007) (discussing ways “to resist having the institutions of democracy
harnessed to what may be termed ‘illiberal democracy’”).
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they take. 236 From this perspective, the Court’s procedural
standing decisions marked a “wrong turn” (to borrow the
metaphor used by the great proceduralist David L. Shapiro
in his well-known essay on the Eleventh Amendment) 237—a
conscious interpretive decision to exclude expressive and
non-instrumental values of equality, respect, and dignity
from its consideration of procedural rights.
Indeed, over the last forty years, the Supreme Court has
taken a number of “wrong turns” in its approach to process
values. To those who follow the nooks and crannies of civil
procedure, the story we put forward is a familiar one. Much
has been written about the Warren Court’s “democratization
of constitutional enforcement” and the role of rights of action,
remedies, and other procedural mechanisms in seeking to
expand democratic practice in the United States. 238 The
Court’s later retrenchment in its treatment of procedural
rights coincided with the emergence of a self-identified
conservative movement that explicitly sought to counter the
effects of New Deal and Great Society projects in broadening
political access and extending social protection. 239 Through
236. Linz, supra note 214, at 4.
237. See David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984).
238. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 25 (2012); see also David L. Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due
Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 843 (1976) (“The history of
public law during the past decade has been, in no small part, a history of the
expansion of procedural protection.”).
239. Politically, some trace the movement to the now-famous memo of Lewis
Powell to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, written before his appointment to the
Supreme Court, setting out a strategy for corporate mobilization “to transform
American law and politics”; intellectually, commentators attribute the
movement’s fire power to the economic libertarianism of James M. Buchanan and
his development of public choice theory. See NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN
CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA
125 (2017). To be sure, this history is contentious and normatively freighted. In
our view, the conservative movement initially encouraged the Court’s “hostility
to litigation,” Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84
TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2006), at least as long as that hostility was coupled with
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well-known doctrinal shifts, some effected through five-tofour majorities, 240 the Court has narrowed procedural access
in areas such as pleading, 241 case management, 242

“skepticism about the general project of private regulatory enforcement.” David
L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 41, 45–46 (2014). But
the tides turned, and soon conservative advocacy groups saw the strategic
benefits of both litigation and courts to their political ambitions. See Karen
O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of Public
Interest Law, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483, 493–501 (1984) (recounting the
history of conservative litigation up through 1984). The legal strategy was very
successful and produced groundbreaking precedents. See generally Mark A.
Graber, Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative Era, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 675 (2006); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, A New
(Republican) Litigation State?, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 657 (2021) (discussing the
conservative shift to private enforcement as a social change strategy). Some of
these lawsuits faltered on the shoals of standing doctrine, leading some
commentators to speculate whether the Court would reassess its approach to
Article III standing and even to deconstitutionalize the doctrine. See generally
Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative
Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551 (2012). The
emergence and legal strategies of this conservative legal movement are beyond
the scope of this Article.
240. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure
Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 331 (2012).
The ideological 5–4 splits, in which the more conservative justices prevail,
have not been random. The Court has divided sharply in cases addressing
compelled arbitration of civil rights claims in lieu of litigation, class actions,
and pleading in civil rights actions—all cases bluntly limiting certain
plaintiffs’ access to the courts and constraining (as a legal or practical
matter) the meaningful opportunity to obtain judicial remedies for
violations of rights.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
241. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For
the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 112
(2008) (arguing that the Court’s pleading decisions have “effectively created more
barriers to access to the courts and . . . deviated from Lincoln’s idea of a
representative government ‘for the people’”). On the impact of the Court’s
plausibility pleading standard, see generally, for example, Raymond H. Brescia
& Edward J. Ohanian, The Politics of Procedure: An Empirical Analysis of Motion
Practice in Civil Rights Litigation Under the New Plausibility Standard, 47
AKRON L. REV. 329 (2014).
242. See Helen Hershkoff & Rolf Stürner, Managerial Judging and Procedural
Convergence: Judicial Role as Democratic Practice, in CONSTITUTIONAL
TRANSPLANTS (Anat Scolnikov ed.) (forthcoming) (on file with the authors).
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remedies, 243 and arbitration 244—a trend defended by those
who cast litigation and administrative proceedings as too
expensive, too time consuming, and too detrimental to
productivity and wealth. 245 Further, the Court’s overall
approach has contributed to democratic backsliding by
enabling the displacement of public rules of procedure with
private contractual terms, often imposed by the stronger
party without any meaningful consent by the weaker
party. 246 They have placed outsized emphasis on court
savings at the expense of fairness and equity. 247 They have
reduced the accountability both of government and corporate
actors. 248 And they have exacerbated difficulties of “have
nots” to secure relief, to organize, to make issues salient, and
to leverage collective power for social mobilization. 249
Are the Court’s procedural standing decisions simply one
more data point in a chart marking this democratic erosion?
Critically, we view these decisions as of a different order
from, say, the Court’s approach to Federal Rule of Civil

243. See, e.g., Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America:
The Counter-Revolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 693–94 (2008).
244. See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 507, 521–24 (2011). See also generally Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K:
Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Economic Inequalities in Open Courts
and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018).
245. See generally Arthur R. Miller, Widening the Lens: Refocusing the
Litigation Cost-and-Delay Narrative, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 57 (2018) (questioning
this criticism of litigation).
246. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619, 1624 (2018)
(holding that mandatory arbitration agreements between employers and
employees are enforceable notwithstanding Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act).
247. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2006) (replacing
the traditional standard of notice pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8 with that of plausibility).
248. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009) (dismissing pretrial
detainee’s complaint as insufficiently alleged).
249. For a leading account of the concept of procedural “have nots,” see
generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
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Procedure 23 on class actions 250 or the Federal Arbitration
Act 251—for the simple reason that the Court insists that its
procedural standing decisions are constitutionally grounded
in Article III. Refusing to treat the violation of a
congressionally conferred right of action as injury for Article
III purposes not only strips the right holder of the dignity,
equality, and respect that comes through procedural access,
but also strips Congress of its law-making capacity to
recognize new forms of participatory rights that may be
enforceable in federal court. 252
The significance of the Court’s interpretation of Article
III is thus profound. With the close of the Lochner era, the
Court adopted a broadly deferential posture towards “social
and economic” legislation, reserving heightened forms of
scrutiny for the protection of individual rights. 253 That
constitutional settlement began to unravel as the Court’s
ideology shifted through the turn of the last century, and the
Court’s procedural standing decisions have contributed to
250. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011)
(denying class certification in employment discrimination suit).
251. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619.
252. Cases like Summers and Spokeo, while interpreting Article III, serve to
constrict Congress’s Article I powers in ways that are analogous to City of Boerne,
in which the Court interpreted Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to bar
Congress from creating remedies that purportedly change the meaning of a
constitutional right. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding
that enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded the
enforcement power of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); see Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (2003) (discussing the Court’s
narrowing of Congress’s Section 5 power and the extent to which its approach is
“fundamentally indifferent to the subtle but fundamental interconnections
between the constitutional dimensions of our political life and the democratic
dimensions of our constitutional culture”).
253. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy, and Constitutional Law, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1281–86, 1290–93 (1993) (describing use of rationality review
for economic legislation and its extension to social welfare legislation); see also
David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1251
(“The footnote marked the end of the pre-New Deal era when the Court was
hostile to social welfare and regulatory legislation, and it foreshadowed the
Warren Court’s attack on segregation and expansion of constitutional rights.”).
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the displacement of this constitutional equilibrium. 254 These
decisions distort participatory rights in favor of parties that
support deregulatory initiatives, because those interests
come armed with a procedural right that is attached to
property or some other common law right, and so can show
injury to a particular and concrete interest. In the Court’s
metric, no weight is given to a legislatively created right that
lacks a close analogue in the common law—a view that would
treat many democratic practices as no more than
unenforceable procedural rights in vacuo. Although it
generally is assumed that Congress can circumvent the effect
of Supreme Court decisions through substitute forms of
legislation, 255 the Court’s standing decisions go a long way
toward preventing Congress from engaging in replacement
strategies. 256 Article III as reconceived by the Court thus
may block legislative efforts to mitigate its negative effects
on the separation of powers, federalism, and possibilities for
democratic governance. 257
254. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, 2019 SUP. CT.
REV. 111, 117 (asking whether “the Court may soon converge on a maximally
anti-Carolene stance: barring all institutions, not just federal courts, from
correcting democratic failures”).
255. See Tushnet, supra note 40, at 1503 (“Finding some constitutional text
obstructing our ability to reach a desired goal, we work around that text using
other texts—and do so without (obviously) distorting the tools we use.”).
256. See generally Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing
Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159 (2011) (discussing numerous standing problems
that Congress faces).
257. We acknowledge that Congress could enact rights of action to be enforced
in state courts or by administrative agencies. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
141 S. Ct. 2190, 2224 & n.9 (2021) (citing Thomas B. Bennett, The Paradox of
Exclusive State-Court Jurisdiction over Federal Claims, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1211
(2021)) (noting that state courts are not bound by Article III and could continue
to hear federal causes of action that do not meet Article III requirements). See
generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001) (discussing constitutional and
institutional differences between federal courts and the courts of the different
states, including differences in their conceptions of the judicial power). These are
incomplete solutions. For example, in private disputes heard in state court,
generally a losing defendant will be able to assert standing on appeal to the
Supreme Court, but a losing plaintiff could not. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490
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But there is more to the Court’s approach to procedural
rights that ought to raise democratic alarms; the procedural
standing cases are only one of a number of interpretive
“wrong turns” by which the Court has shorn the Constitution
of intrinsic process values, diminishing procedure to only an
instrumental role. Process, in the Court’s analysis, has
become a matter of adjudicative technology without regard
to its democratic role. Efficiency is valued, as is accuracy—
and although these are important features of any judicial
system, in our view the work of the courts cannot be reduced
to that of a business dispensing goods and services at the
cheapest cost to users. More than that, the Court has not
simply elevated instrumental values; it also has exiled
intrinsic process values from the range of justifications that
can support Congress’s power to enact judicially enforceable
procedural rights. This rhetorical move is allied with Richard
Pildes’s theory of “exclusionary reasons”—meaning, “reasons
not to act.” 258 According to the Court, Congress cannot
constitutionally act to protect the value of participation in
and of itself; Congress can use procedure only in service of
instrumental goals, without regard to its constitutive role in
democratic practice. We offer two examples of the way in
which the Court has extinguished consideration of intrinsic
process values from constitutional analysis: the Court’s
approach to the Due Process Clause and to the Seventh
Amendment civil jury right.
Since 1976, the question of whether state action complies
with procedural due process has been subject to the threefactor balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 259 which looks
to “the private interest that will be affected,” then, the “risk
of an erroneous deprivation” and “the probable value, if any,
of additional . . . procedural safeguards,” and finally, “the

U.S. 605, 618 (1989).
258. Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons
in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 712 (1994).
259. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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Government’s interest.” 260 Before Mathews, the Court had
resisted any formulaic conception of procedural due process;
as Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath put it, “‘[D]ue process’
cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any
formula . . . . Due process is not a mechanical instrument.” 261
Mathews defined the government’s interest in terms of
alleviating “fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail”; 262 no regard was given to the democratic value of fair
and open adjudication. Likewise, the private interest at
stake was defined narrowly, confined to the actual financial
benefit claimed to have been wrongly denied (in claimant
Eldridge’s case, cash disability payments). Very quickly the
Mathews balancing test became the target of scholarly
reproach, summed up in Jerry L. Mashaw’s criticism that the
decision “views the sole purpose of procedural protections as
enhancing accuracy, and . . . [n]o attention is paid to ‘process
values’ that might inhere in oral proceedings or to the
demoralization costs that may result from the grantwithdrawal . . . sequence to which claimants . . . are
subjected.” 263 As Jane Rutherford later commented, “By
focusing on accuracy instead of participation, the discourse
of due process shift[ed] from ‘who participates?’ to ‘what
works?’ . . . [T]he individual’s right to tell her story possesses
no independent value.” 264 Some commentators have insisted
that the Mathews Court did not intend to reduce the due
process inquiry to a calculus or algorithm, 265 and instead was
260. Id. at 335.
261. 341 U.S. 123, 162–63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
262. Mathews, 424 U.S at 335.
263. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of
a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976).
264. Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 48 (1992).
265. Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo A. Montero, “Oh Lord,
Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering the Mathews v. Eldridge
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trying only to provide a rhetorical frame to discipline a line
of decisions that some viewed as “chaotic,” 266 but others
regarded as “serious efforts to deal with a complex legal
issue: the relationship between procedural due process and
the activities of an administrative state.” 267 Accurate
decision-making with due regard for facts is of course an
important feature of government accountability. 268 But
whatever the Court’s original design in Mathews, later
applications of the three-part balancing test have been clear
in emphasizing accuracy as the “primary” goal of process
without regard to its broader democratic role. 269 In an
illustrative case, issued shortly after Mathews, the Court
stated that “the function of legal process is to minimize the

and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2005)
(describing the Court’s evolving treatment of Mathews as setting out “a
framework in which legal actors can speak to each other about fairness,” in which
the “framework is not meant to be exclusive,” to a “test” or “tool” or “decisionmaking algorithm” that displaced any inquiry into fairness and justified
procedure solely for its instrumental power to reduce error).
266. Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
Adjudication—A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 319 (1957).

Process

267. Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 1044, 1082 (1984).
268. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1162–63 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (“The principle that the government must support its allegations with
substantial evidence, not conclusions and secret evidence, guards against
arbitrary executive decisionmaking . . . . Without it, people . . . are left to the
mercy of a bureaucrat’s caprice.”).
269. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[A] primary function
of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 785 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he standard of
proof is a crucial component of legal process, the primary function of which is ‘to
minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.’”); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
692 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (“The reason that the Constitution requires a
State to provide ‘due process of law’ when it punishes an individual for
misconduct is to protect the individual from erroneous or mistaken punishment
that the State would not have inflicted had it found the facts in a more reliable
way.”); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005) (defining an incarcerated
plaintiff’s interest as “avoiding erroneous placement at [a supermax prison]”);
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 332 (1993) (“At least to the extent protected by the
Due Process Clause, the interest of a person subject to governmental action is in
the accurate determination of the matters before the court.”).
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risk of erroneous decisions.” 270 An individual’s dignity or
autonomy interests do not figure into the calculus 271—nor, as
one federal district judge put it, does “the plain old value of
process itself, i.e., of simply knowing why the government
has decided to take action against you.” 272
The procedural right at issue in Mathews clearly was in
service of a “concrete” benefit that could be cashed out in
classic pocket-book terms. 273 But the participation right
afforded other benefits, as well, expressing the government’s
respect for the claimant on a par with other members of the
polity and affirming the claimant’s dignity. 274 By shaping the
relationship between the government and the governed, the
procedure had democratic value separate and apart from its
bottom-line effect on the accuracy of an agency’s decision. 275
270. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (overruling lower court
determination that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
involuntary civil commitment case). So entrenched is this view that even Justice
Kagan recently described Mathews as an “inquiry into the requested procedure’s
usefulness in correcting erroneous deprivations of [individuals’] private interest.”
Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 334 (2014) (Kagan, J.).
271. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970) (recognizing a due process
right to a hearing before terminating a claimant’s public assistance benefits, and
explaining that “important governmental interests are promoted by affording
recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. From its founding the Nation’s
basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons
within its borders.”).
272. Hicks v. Colvin, 214 F. Supp. 3d 627, 641 n.7 (E.D. Ky. 2016).
273. For the theory that treats welfare benefits on a constitutional par with
common law property, see generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964).
274. Michelman, supra note 73, at 402 (arguing that “a political arrangement
is defective if it fails to serve self-government in roughly the way that democracy,
according to some theory, is supposed to serve it. . . . Democracy serves selfgovernment by providing each individual with reason to identify his or her
political agency with the lawmaking and other acts of political institutions, or to
claim such acts as his or her own.”).
275. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983) (offering an
alternative to the conventional judicial review/adjudicative hearing approach of
administrative legitimacy). Critics of the Mathews test recognized that an
adversarial-type hearing was not the only procedure that could meet due process,
but rather the process due, as Justice Brennan had recognized in Goldberg v.
Kelly, was to be “tailored to the capacities and circumstances” of the claimants
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As Edward L. Rubin has put it, the process value of dignity,
“[p]roperly conceived, . . . is a theory about the stance that
government should take toward the people it rules.” 276 This
relational aspect of due process, ignored by the Mathews
Court, signals respect for the individual and is constitutive
of democratic life. 277 And more: the individual right to
participate enables individuals who otherwise lack power to
engage in collective action and social mobilization that
potentially can influence the policies and values by which
they are bound. 278 To return to Sparer’s analysis of
procedural rights:
The decision to pursue litigation and other efforts to gain
recognition for a welfare recipient’s constitutional right to a hearing
prior to termination of benefits was part and parcel of the
organizing strategy of the welfare rights movement, designed to
amplify the organized forces—particularly the organized welfare
recipient forces—of the movement. 279

and their claims. 397 U.S. at 268–69; see also, e.g., Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due
Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1376 (drawing from a reconceptualized Due
Process Clause the requirement of a “management system for assuring accurate
and timely processing” of claims).
276. Rubin, supra note 267, at 1098. For a related argument grounded in social
psychology, see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice
in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 136 (2011) (associating due process
with the fact that “individuals value being treated with courtesy and respect,
because these factors ‘recognize[] and acknowledge[]’ individuals’ ‘dignity as
people and as members of society’” (citing Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome
and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 122 (2000))).
277. For a similar argument, see Rubin, supra note 267, at 1101 (defining the
“right” to procedural due process “in terms of interpersonal relationships without
being separately contained in, or owned by, any of the participants in those
relationships”).
278. For a criticism of the Mathews test and its impact on the political life of
poor people at the end of the twentieth century, see Zietlow, supra note 98, at 9
(“To be a citizen is to be able to take part in the functioning of government, and
in the process by which decisions are made. Yet, we are currently in the middle
of an unheralded due process crisis, which threatens to exclude a large number
of people—the poorest members of American society—from almost every aspect
of participation in the processes by which decisions about them are made, and
thus reduces their status to less than full citizenship.”).
279. Sparer, supra note 99, at 562; see also FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD
CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 306–20
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By eliminating intrinsic process values, the Court not only
has ignored the injury suffered by the claimant to the basic
right to self-governance, but also has entrenched power
imbalances that upset democratic equilibrium.
The Court’s approach to the Seventh Amendment civil
jury right likewise has crowded out regard for the jury’s
intrinsic value as a democratic institution, replacing it with
a focus on the cost and accuracy of the jury as a factual
decision-maker. By its terms, the Seventh Amendment
applies to actions “at common law,” and at least since the
First Judiciary Act, judges in civil jury cases have decided
questions of law and jurors have decided questions of fact. 280
In its American origin story, the jury was seen as “the
essence of democracy . . . . Through the jury, the citizenry
takes part in the execution of the nation’s law, and in that
way, each can rightly claim that the law belongs partly to
him or her.” 281 In the federal courts, this allocation of
(1971) (discussing the importance of procedural rights to political organizing
efforts).
280. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. While there are historical debates about the
recentness of the principle, there at least is long precedent for juries being given
issues of fact. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (“[T]he trial of
issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.”). Scholars also note the substantial
leeway early juries exerted over questions of law. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 1022–23 (11th ed. 2013) (collecting
sources), and courts and commentators continue to press for the jury’s role “to act
as the conscience of the community,” as Justice Tom Clark put it, to “add[] a
humanistic touch to the strict demands of the law.” John Gsanger & Reilly
Gsanger, The Seventh Amendment’s Balance Between Community-Based Justice
and the Appellate Courts, 27 APP. ADVOC. 676, 684 (2015). This notion of
community-based justice is to be distinguished from jury nullification, which has
been criticized as anti-democratic because arguably it “denies the legislative
process.” Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical
View, 54 TEX. L. REV. 488, 513 n.111 (1976).
281. William G. Young, A Lament for What Was Once and Yet Can Be, 32 B.C.
INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 305, 310 (2009); see also Jon D. Levy, The Civil Jury: A
Defining Element of Participatory Democracy, 30 ME. BAR J. 232, 232 (2015)
(acknowledging “the modern view is that . . . the civil jury trial is, by design, the
cause of its own demise because, like businesses that grow out of touch with the
needs of their customers, the civil jury trial is a ‘product’ that has become too
inconvenient and too expensive relative to the alternatives”).
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decision-making was designed to operate not merely as a
technical rule of administration, but rather as a principle of
popular restraint on Article III judges that safeguards
adjudicative legitimacy. 282 At the mid-twentieth century,
Justice Brennan, writing in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc., 283 thus called the jury “[a]n
essential characteristic” of the federal system—functioning
as “an independent system for administering justice to
litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction”—that
“distributes trial functions between judge and jury.” 284 Two
landmark decisions of the same vintage, Beacon Theatres v.

282. See Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh
Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1059 (1999) (discussing features of the civil
jury, including its participatory and non-majoritarian, deliberative forms of
decision-making, that enable it “to serve as a democratic check on the judicial
branch, which is not itself a democratic institution”); Developments in the Law—
The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1421, 1433 n.94 (1997) (explaining that “the
jury confers legitimacy ‘actually’ in the sense that individual representative
citizens constitute the jury . . . [and] ‘vicariously’ in the sense that it promotes a
general and collective sense of community involvement in the legal system, a
belief that the community as a whole speaks when a jury renders a verdict”); see
also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 62–63 (1989) (discussing the
jury as a check on “the decisions of judges who enjoy life tenure” and on nonArticle III judges “who are appointed for fixed terms [and] may be beholden to
Congress or Executive officials”).
283. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
284. Id. at 537. So important was the jury to the federal system, that the Byrd
Court did not follow the “outcome-determinative” logic of the earlier line of Erie
cases: A federal court sitting in diversity was to apply its allocation of power in
the face of an inconsistent state rule, even though, as Allen Ides has explained,
“the outcome caused by the allocation of judge and jury functions was far from
certain.” Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to Be Applied in Diversity
Cases: A Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine
and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 55 (1995). The anti-democratic effects of
the Court’s application of the Erie doctrine, together with its preemption of tort
claims, is beyond the scope of this Article, both of which have been commented
upon in the procedural literature. See, e.g., Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist
Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1389 (1996) (discussing the Court’s creation of a
federal military contractor defense in tort actions as reflecting “disregard of
separation of powers” and as having “invaded the province of the states”). See
generally JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation Reform, State
Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717 (2004).
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Westover 285 and Dairy Queen v. Wood, 286 emphasized the
importance of respecting the civil jury right in “hybrid” cases,
when the legal issue is combined in one suit with those that
historically would have been heard in equity. 287
It is well known that the number of civil jury trials has
steadily declined—indeed it has “plummeted.” 288 The
Supreme Court has been a driver of the trend, 289 through
judicial case management that encourages the parties to
settle, 290 invigoration of disposition through early and
summary procedures such as the Federal Rule 12 motion to
dismiss and Federal Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment, 291 and encouragement of contractual waivers that
mandate alternative dispute resolution and are treated as

285. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
286. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
287. As Arthur R. Miller has commented, these decisions “signal[ed] the
expansion of the jury trial right regardless of historical restraints” and
“represent[ed] an extraordinary commitment by the Court to the civil jury
institution.” Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1081 (2003).
288. Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica M. Salerno, Reasons for the
Disappearing Jury Trial: Perspectives from Attorneys and Judges, 81 LA. L. REV.
119, 162 (2020); see also Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical
Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1503–04 (2003).
289. Warren Burger, as Chief Justice of the United States, took the lead in
urging the profession to “think[] the unthinkable” and to consider limiting use of
the jury in complex civil cases to blue-ribbon panels, on the view that the
“ordinary juror” could not bring “common sense . . . to bear in a complex,
economic, or scientific case.” Warren E. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31
LOY. L. REV. 205, 220 (1985); see Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The
Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities
Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 357 n.204 (2010) (“Perhaps this
hostility toward the Seventh Amendment merely represents the judiciary’s
hostility toward direct democracy.”).
290. Young, supra note 281, at 314.
291. Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1890 (2008). See generally John H. Langbein, The
Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522 (2012)
(discussing case management, discovery, and summary judgment as eclipsing the
trial and making it obsolete).
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waivers of the civil jury right. 292 Although the Court has
never devised a “complexity” exception to the Seventh
Amendment—or directly endorsed use of the “blue ribbon”
jury 293—in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 294 it took
a step in both directions. The case itself involved a patent
dispute over a device used to track dry cleaning inventory.
The Court found that interpreting the scope of a particular
patentee’s rights under a patent claim is a task for judges. 295
The opinion rests neither on historical practice nor
precedent, and nowhere considered the jury’s democratic
role. Instead, the Court looked to “functional
considerations”—the Court’s estimation of the abilities of
jurors, 296 which it found deficient relative to the judge’s
“trained ability.” 297
Criticisms of the cost and inefficiency of the civil jury are
not new. 298 Some of the criticisms rest on empirical analysis,

292. See Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as
a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 19 (2003).
293. See Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE
L.J. 1155, 1172 n.110 (1980) (proposing use of a special jury in complex civil
litigation where “special knowledge” is required that cannot be learned “during
the course of the trial”).
294. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
295. Id. at 388–91.
296. Id. at 388. Later, in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct.
1668, 1680 (2019), the Court held that the judge, and not the jury, is the “better
positioned” decision-maker to resolve contested factual questions when the legal
issue is whether a federal agency has disapproved a company’s practice (in this
case, a change in pharmaceutical label).
297. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390. The decline in jury trials runs in tandem with
a decline in civil trials overall. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Diminished
Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131, 2147 (2018) (“[W]e are witnessing both the
disappearance and the downsizing of the American civil trial,” without knowing
“what precisely is gained, and what is lost.”); see also William G. Young,
Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 67, 73 (2006) (“[T]he civil jury trial has all but disappeared.”). For an
evaluation of the negative effects of this trend, see, for example, Judith Resnik,
The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1835–37 (2014).
298. See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13
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even if flawed; some rest only on rhetoric. 299 What is more
difficult to measure is the damage done to democratic society
when the Court declines to credit the civil jury as a “political
institution,” in de Tocqueville’s sense 300—and instead treats
the jury as merely a form of judicial technology for the
“resolution of factual issues.” 301 To borrow from Ellen Sward,
“[T]he jury is the only governmental institution we have that
reflects the ideal of direct citizen participation and
deliberation, giving rise to “an institutional interest . . . in
preserving the only governmental institution that reflects

MICH. L. REV. 302, 303 (1915) (Sunderland argued that the jury’s inefficiency “lies
in its want of technical knowledge. Men temporarily called from the ordinary
affairs of life, untrained in the law, are incapable of performing the functions of
judges in any but the most primitive communities.”); Alfred C. Coxe, The Trials
of Jury Trials, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 286, 289 (1901) (“It is the delay, the uncertainty,
the expense, the inability to reach results, which has put the jury system out of
touch with an age of intense material activity . . . .”); see also Stephan Landsman,
The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 579, 607–14 (1993) (citing Charles E. Clark & Harry Shulman, Jury Trial in
Civil Cases—A Study in Judicial Administration, 43 YALE L.J. 867, 884 (1934))
(discussing judicial efforts in the nineteenth century to curtail the role of the jury
in tort cases; tracing the “rhetoric of efficiency” that emerged in the twentieth
century; and criticizing the flawed empirical work of Charles E. Clark, “no friend
of the jury,” in arguing that the jury was “expensive, cumbersome and
comparatively inefficient”).
299. Empirical studies do not support claims that jury verdicts are
unreasonable, outside the law, or lacking in deliberation. See Stephen B.
Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 403 (2011) (stating that “those
consulting systematic empirical evidence rather than anecdotes find that the
attacks on the jury are unsupported”).
300. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 281 (Alfred A. Knopf,
15th ed. 1985) (1830). But see Renée Lettow Lerner, The Surprising Views of
Montesquieu and Tocqueville about Juries: Juries Empower Judges, 81 LA. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2020) (“For Montesquieu and Tocqueville . . . the main point of juries
was to mask judicial power . . . . [J]udges should gently but authoritatively guide
jurors to a proper understanding of law and facts. According to Tocqueville, the
main point of jurors’ education in the ‘free school’ for democracy was to learn to
defer to a more competent authority—the judge.” (emphasis added)).
301. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973); see Landsman, supra note
298, at 579 (explaining that in Colgrove v. Battin, “[r]ather than considering the
. . . multiple functions served by the jury, the Court focused on only a single
aspect of the jury’s work as adjudicator”).
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these values.” 302 The jury thus helps both to constitute and
to legitimate what Paul D. Carrington and others have called
the “democratic courthouse,” 303 making legislators “doubly
accountable to the people, who first elect their lawmakers
and are then called to administer the laws those
representatives make.” 304 And participation in the jury,
which has become more inclusive (although barriers to
selection and eligibility remain), 305 contributes to a sense of
legal trust and political community. 306 Unquestionably, we
anticipate criticisms that the democratic defense of the jury
is overstated—nostalgic, idealized, and without credibility or
hard data to support the basic claim. 307 Empirical studies
can measure cost and delay and thus tilt against preserving
the jury. Empirical studies, however, may be less faithful
indicators of intangible injuries, and certainly of the
intangible injury to democracy when citizens are blocked
from processes of self-governance because they are said to be
incompetent, and their participation is treated as an
302. Sward, supra note 282, at 1118.
303. Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J.
COMPAR. & INT’L L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 79, 79 (2003); see also JUDITH RESNIK &
DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN
CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 16 (2011) (referring to the “vanishing
trial” and the privatization of process).
304. Carrington, supra note 303, at 85; see Albert W. Dzur, Democracy’s “Free
School”: Tocqueville and Lieber on the Value of the Jury, 38 POL. THEORY 603, 623
(2010) (“The jury is a reminder that the power of judgment is to be grounded in
widespread citizen participation not only in extraordinary circumstances, . . . but
constantly and concretely day after day in ordinary American courtrooms.”).
305. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, The Contemporary
American Jury, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 239, 244 (2018) (stating that
“[a]lthough the contemporary American jury is far more heterogeneous and
representative than it has ever been, systematic underrepresentation . . .
persists,” and arguing that underrepresentation affects the “legitimacy for the
jury system” and the quality of “deliberation”).
306. Carrington, supra note 303, at 87 (arguing that “a republic trusting its
citizens to sit as jurors is more likely to be trusted by them, and on that account
is more likely to remain a republic”).
307. See, e.g., Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61
EMORY L.J. 1331, 1334–36 (2012) (arguing that the democratic role of the jury is
overstated).
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unnecessary expense.
C. Reorienting Procedural Standing Doctrine
The metaphor of “wrong turn” might suggest that the
anti-democratic tendencies in the Court’s procedural
standing decisions can be fixed with an interpretive
reversal 308—redefining Article III injury to include violations
of congressionally conferred procedural rights. We do think
the Court should take that step. But as the discussion of due
process and the civil jury right suggests, the Court’s
suppression of intrinsic process values has not been confined
to justiciability doctrine. Nor have the effects been cabined
to the courthouse, for the Court’s approach has amplified the
ability of litigants to challenge or hobble laws that seek to
make American democracy more inclusive 309—laws that
address democratic processes such as the right to vote,
legislative districting, and campaign finance. 310 Justice
308. Cf. Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel,
47 VAND. L. REV. 993, 1000–01 (1994) (“The metaphor of a Court that has simply
taken a ‘wrong turn’ no longer seems descriptive. . . . Even if the Court were
repopulated with liberals, one must doubt whether they would simply return to
the old project.”).
309. See James Sample, The Decade of Democracy’s Demise, 69 AM. U. L. REV.
1559, 1615 (2020) (“Over the past decade, the Court’s decisions in both the
campaign finance and voting rights contexts have undermined representationreinforcing values by increasing the concentration of political power in the rich
and powerful and, in turn, reducing the role of the average citizen in his or her
democracy.”); see also Shah, supra note 37, at 215–22 (questioning whether the
Court has applied its procedural standing doctrine in racially disparate ways).
310. See Sample, supra note 309, at 1562.
In the span of a decade, a majority of the Court has imposed its will on
nearly every major element of our democratic processes: from voting to
gerrymandering to campaign finance and even to bribery and misconduct.
In these decisions, the Court majority systematically disregarded
legislative will at their leisure and replaced it with their own judgment of
fairness and societal need. During the past decade, the Court consistently
rejected legislative attempts at equalizing access to democracy, dismissed
attempts by Congress to target quid pro quo corruption, narrowed the
definition of quid pro quo public corruption to the eye of a needle, and rolled
out the red carpet for partisan gerrymandering. Even more
consequentially, there is a snowball effect at play: the decade of new high
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Frankfurter, concurring in Malinski v. New York, wrote,
“The history of American freedom is, in no small measure,
the history of procedure.” 311 The history of American
democratic decline might similarly be measured.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that standing doctrine as it treats the
violation of congressionally conferred procedural rights
threatens democratic erosion by denying the intrinsic worth
of democratic self-governance, blocking the procedural
pathways through which democracy is practiced, and giving
insufficient weight to validly enacted laws. As a matter of
doctrine, we have urged a course correction: that the Court
treat the violation of a congressionally conferred procedural
right to participate as a particular and concrete injury even
if the right holder anticipates no financial pay-out or suffers
no non-procedural harm separate from the denial of the
right. The concern we raise, while it may appear narrow,
provides a window into the broader problem of how
procedure needs to be devised to protect and sustain
American democracy. 312
In 1943, reckoning with the potential triumph of fascism,
Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal asked: “Which
procedures actually aid or hamper the realization of human
Court precedent in the areas of campaign finance and voting rights gets
extended yet further as waves of more and more conservative justices join
the federal bench.
Id. at 1561–62. Compare Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 251–56 (2002) (drawing on and adding content to the Carolene
Products theory of constitutional review), with Schuette v. Coal. to Def.
Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 322 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (urging that
the cases supporting “the political-process doctrine . . . be overruled”).
311. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
312. Cf. Edward B. Foley, Electoral Dispute Resolution: The Need for a New
Sub-Specialty, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 286 (2012) (calling for renewed
attention to “attempts to develop new and better procedures for operating a
democratic society”).
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dignity? How can the institutions of legislation, adjudication,
administration, production, and distribution be adjusted to
democratic survival?” 313 These questions present themselves
today with special urgency. In this Article, we have
attempted a candid assessment of how well the Court’s
approach to procedural violations as a basis for standing
supports democratic values. We have argued that even
before the current crisis, the Supreme Court—distrusted
conceptually as a counter-majoritarian institution—
suppressed intrinsic process values that we place at the core
of democracy: equality, respect, and dignity. Others have
urged reforming the Supreme Court to align constitutional
interpretation with democratic values. 314 Still others have
sought to reimagine administrative practice. 315 Without
engaging in these arguments, we have sought to reorient
standing doctrine in ways that would enable the Supreme
Court to function as a “limited” partner in “democratic
society,” and not as its assailant.

313. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public
Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 214 (1943).
314. Cf. Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court,
109 CALIF. L. REV. 1703, 1720 (2021) (“[T]he progressive frame challenges the
background assumption that the Supreme Court achieves normative legitimacy
when it engages in apolitical or neutral exercise of its power, rather than the
amount of power consistent with democratic values. Its frame points in the
direction not of relegitimating but reallocating judicial power.”).
315. See BLAKE EMERSON, THE PUBLIC’S LAW: ORIGINS AND ARCHITECTURE OF
PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 1–2 (Oxford Univ. Press 2019) (acknowledging that the
“administrative state . . . appears not to be democratic,” and calling for ways to
“structure the state to empower the public sphere” by setting out legal obligations
that “guarantee a condition of shared freedom among all of the political
community’s members”).

